EU Accession, NGOs, and Human Rights: Discrimination against the Roma in Slovenia and Croatia*

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Draft date: August 27, 2013

This paper measures discrimination against the Roma (commonly known by the disfavored term ‘Gypsies’) to test the ground level efficacy of two strategies of human rights improvement: top-down diffusion and bottom-up change. The study spans three towns, Murska Sobota and Novo mesto in Slovenia and Čakovec in Croatia, and includes over 600 subjects. Levels of discrimination were estimated via trust games played with money, which are particularly appropriate because the Roma are widely stereotyped as cheaters and thieves. The findings suggest that the EU accession process, widely regarded as an exceptionally strong incentive-based mechanism of rights diffusion, does not severely reduce discrimination on the ground. Instead, they suggest that ground level organizing aimed at improving relations between Roma and non-Roma helps reduce discrimination.

*I would like to thank George Downs, Michael Gilligan, Bernarda Bračić and W. Nicholson Price II for invaluable help in developing this project. I am also very grateful to Eva Bračić, Štefan Bajić, Vanessa Bobetić, Dragan Bogdan, Željko Balog, Mojca Bečaj, Jožek Horvat Muc, Manja Munda, Živa Kleindienst, Vera Klopcić, Jaka Kukavica, Rebecca Morton, Tena Posel, Sabina Ranogajec, Monika Sandreli, David Stasavage, Filip Škiljan, Joshua Tucker, Milena Tudija, Lucija Viha, and an anonymous Croatian government official.

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For a Roma, the easiest personal document to obtain, by far, is the death certificate.¹

This fact, wryly passed around as a joke within circles of government experts, NGO workers, and activists, speaks clearly to the depth of discrimination against the Roma observed in Central and Eastern Europe today. In many of these states ethnic minorities are protected by law, and discrimination is no longer a matter of state policy.² Instead, rights violations now occur as a result of personal bigotry. For example, a Roma job applicant might look good on paper but be refused an interview once her ethnic identity becomes evident.³ A man with Roma-like features is more readily mistreated by police when in custody.⁴ A Roma is more likely to end up as the sole patient in a room of six whose hospital bed receives frequent changes of sheets as the result of the humiliating presumption that he or she is dirty.⁵ Such slights and rights violations are no less real for their not being state sanctioned and they have endured well past the time when the state has addressed its more egregious discriminatory practices.

In what follows I investigate the relative efficacy of two strategies of human rights improvement widely believed to reduce such ground level discrimination: top-down diffusion and bottom-up change. I proceed by first testing the received wisdom that the EU accession process, a strong incentive-based mechanism of rights change, drastically reduces ground level

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1. I encountered versions of this statement in Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic and Croatia, between summer 2010 and winter 2012. It refers to administrative barriers that Roma face when trying to obtain personal documents. Often these barriers are not a matter of bureaucracy; administrative officials may hinder the process by withholding information or aid, in extreme cases by stating that obtaining documents is not possible. Macabrely, no such barriers exist when a death certificate is needed.


discrimination against the Roma, which then gradually increases once the state becomes a member of the EU. I find no support for this belief. Second, I test a norms promotion claim: ground level non-governmental organizing geared towards improving Roma/non-Roma relations helps reduce discrimination. I find initial evidence in favor of this hypothesis. The study spans three towns, Murska Sobota and Novo mesto in Slovenia and Čakovec in Croatia, and includes over 600 subjects.

In favor of comparing levels of discrimination in towns that vary in attributes dictated by the two hypotheses but match closely on a host of other factors relevant to human rights in general and Roma rights in particular, I collect data from only three locations. While the sample size is a limitation, this project explores how the two strategies of human rights improvement perform at the ground level. Further work, motivated and guided by the findings here, will endeavor to examine the effects of these strategies cross-nationally.

Despite the project’s field-level focus on the Roma in Croatia and Slovenia, its conclusions can be broadly applied. The Roma are the largest European minority; they reside in most if not all European states and experience discrimination and rights violations everywhere. More importantly, the Roma are the archetype of a minority that has been


9. The lack of a capital “M” in “mesto,” while unusual in English, is grammatically correct in Slovene (“mesto” means city).
discriminated against, abused, and ignored for centuries. I demonstrate that it is possible
to dramatically reduce discrimination even in such a seemingly intractable case. This shows
promise for studying and guiding human rights improvement in various other problematic
populations that historically have been denied or have themselves resisted integration. The
findings might, for example, generalize to the lives of Jews in Argentina, Uzbeks in Tajik-
istan, the San in Namibia, and persons of African descent in Brazil, Ecuador, Panama,
Venezuela, and Peru.\(^\text{10}\)

In the following section I briefly present the Roma and the discrimination they com-
monly face. I next present the two hypotheses. Case selection, methodology, and results
follow. The last section discusses questions left unanswered and concludes.

**Who are the Roma?**

The Roma, commonly referred to by the disfavored term “Gypsies,”\(^\text{11}\) are the largest
ethnic minority in Europe. Population counts are unreliable, but estimates report that as
many as 9 million Roma currently reside in Europe.\(^\text{12}\) The Roma first arrived in Europe at the
end of the 13th century, having emigrated from north-western India centuries before.\(^\text{13}\) Con-
trary to romanticized popular perceptions, they are generally no longer itinerant\(^\text{14}\)—some
groups, in fact, were never peripatetic.\(^\text{15}\) Until very recently many engaged in traditional

\(^{10}\) For more information regarding these populations see Minorities at Risk Project, “Minorities at Risk

\(^{11}\) Roma are also called Romanies, Rrom, Tsingani, Zigeuner, Cigani, Gitanos. See Ian F. Hancock, *We
are the Romani People* (Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002).

\(^{12}\) Zoltan Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics* (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Miriam Polzer-Sriendz, “Romi in Evropska Integracija: Primerjava
Stanja v Sloveniji, Avstriji in na Hrvaškem,” in *Evropa, Slovenija in Romi: Zbornik Referatov na Mednarod-

\(^{13}\) Barany lists Punjab as the region of origin; Courthiade instead lists the city of Kannauj in Uttar
Pradesh. See Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*; Marcel
Courthiade, “The Ganetic City of Kannauj: Original Cradle-town of the Rromani People,” in *Evropa,
Slovenija in Romi: Zbornik Referatov na Mednarodni Konferenci v Ljubljani, 15. februarja 2002*, ed. Vera
Klopčič and Miroslav Polzer (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Inštitut za narodnostna vprašanja, 2003), 145–168.

\(^{14}\) Yaron Matras, “Romani Migrations in the Post-communist Era: Their Historical and Political Signifi-

\(^{15}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.*
economic activities which primarily defined their tribal identities.\(^\text{16}\) While modernization rendered many of those crafts obsolete, tribal diversity survives and to a large extent characterizes Romani individuals.\(^\text{17}\) Although there are exceptions, most Roma speak a dialect of Romani.\(^\text{18}\) The largest concentration of Roma in Eastern Europe is in Romania, followed by Hungary.\(^\text{19}\)

The Roma have historically faced persecution and discrimination. In Romanian principalities of Moldavia and Walachia Romani slavery was institutionalized and persisted until 1864.\(^\text{20}\) In the middle of the 18th century, British and Portuguese powers sought to resolve the “Gypsy problem” by deporting the Roma to the colonies; Maria-Theresa and Joseph II of the Austro-Hungarian Empire attempted to “civilize” the Roma by forcible assimilation, forbidding the Roma from speaking Romani, marrying amongst themselves, and raising Romani children older than five years of age.\(^\text{21}\) The Roma were massively exterminated during the Holocaust,\(^\text{22}\) and relentlessly assimilated into socialist societies afterwards, sometimes with tolerance, as in states like the former Yugoslavia, and sometimes with a heavy coercive hand, as in states like Bulgaria.\(^\text{23}\)

While today many Roma have integrated into their respective majority populations, most remain segregated. The segregated populations are generally socially disadvantaged and bear the brunt of discrimination. In many states, Roma children are schooled in remedial special schools for mentally disabled, whether or not they have actual disabilities.\(^\text{24}\) Roma

\(^{16}\) For example, blacksmiths, drill makers, umbrella makers, knife sharpeners, stone masons, mud house builders, mud oven builders, basket weavers, fortune tellers, horse traders, and pot menders. See Pavla Štrukelj, *Romi na Slovenskem* (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Cankarjeva Založba v Ljubljani, 1980).

\(^{17}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.


\(^{19}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

\(^{20}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

\(^{21}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*, 93.


\(^{23}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

face significant barriers in accessing employment, frequently live without electricity or sewage, generally receive substandard health care, and are often deemed undeserving of social welfare. Many do not have personal documents and are effectively stateless; they are more likely than non-Roma to be abused by the police in general, while in detention, and while in prison. These marginalized populations are therefore predominantly poor, unemployed and undereducated. To survive, numerous Roma engage in illicit activities that range from small scale theft of scrap metal to usury and transnational trafficking in weapons, drugs and humans. Flagrant criminality fuels the already existing intolerance and discrimination and, in a downward spiral, strengthens the barriers that drive the Roma to crime in the first place.

Hypothesis I: The EU Accession Process

The EU accession process is arguably the strongest mechanism for Roma rights change today. Over the past two decades, the EU has become increasingly concerned with the Roma and has launched numerous programs designed to combat discrimination and social exclusion. The accession process is exceptional both in the requirements it sets and in its ability to enforce change. To qualify for membership, candidate states must fulfill the Copenhagen Criteria, of which the first requires “stable institutions guaranteeing . . . human rights and

Debate Education Association, 2002); European Roma Rights Centre, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union (Budapest: European Roma Rights Centre, 2004).


respect for and protection of minorities.”

Ratification of human rights agreements is necessary but not sufficient; the EU demands changes in state policies and practices that range from political representation to education and infrastructure. Unlike most other requirements where the EU demands that candidate states attain a standard commonly held in current EU members, the requirement regarding minority rights is a product of a clear and persisting double standard. The Eastern Enlargement candidates were and are required to meet goals which the Western EU member states have not set for themselves. The attainment of these goals is carefully evaluated and visibly enforced; the European Commission constantly monitors each candidate, producing yearly Progress Reports that detail the states’ rights situation and its shortcomings. In the context of the Roma, for example, settlement visits and conversations with their inhabitants are included in the monitoring process. A state does not become an EU member, with that status’ concomitant benefits,


32. The 2005 Progress Report for Croatia, for example, lists the following problems: the implementation of the Constitutional Law on the Rights of National Minorities (CLNM) is far too slow; changes are needed in other legislation to reflect the CLNM; there are problems with reserved seats for minority representatives in local and regional governments, as well as in state administrative and judicial bodies and the police; there is no program to ensure implementation of the minority representation provisions; discrimination is commonplace; as data are unavailable Croatia urgently needs to provide statistical data on representation; there is a lack of awareness with respect to the function of local minority councils and their financial attainability is not guaranteed; and the media are not optimally representing minorities. Roma issues explicitly mentioned are: the Roma are not integrated; 89 percent of Romani households are without a single member with a permanent income; discrimination is widespread in employment and education; the problem of segregation in schools remains; some local authorities are unwilling to finance Roma programs; and Roma face difficulties in obtaining citizenship. The report also states that the funds currently represented as sufficient for implementing measures to improve the position of the Roma will not be sufficient.


until the requirements are satisfied; at that time, monitoring stops as well.\textsuperscript{35} Scholars widely hold that the treatment of ethnic minorities in the Eastern Enlargement is one of the most striking examples of successful EU conditionality.\textsuperscript{36}

Within the international relations literature on diffusion, this incentive-based mechanism is widely classified as ‘coercion.’\textsuperscript{37} Coercion is generally exercised by governments, international organizations, and nongovernmental actors that set requirements in exchange for aid, loans, or other benefits.\textsuperscript{38} Conditions in return for benefits tend to reflect the preferences of the donor, but a states’ choice to commit to such an agreement is predominantly voluntary.\textsuperscript{39} In the context of human rights, for example, a government can sign a Preferential Trade Agreement with a “hard” human rights clause, thus subjecting itself to stricter human rights standards in exchange for preferred trade conditions.\textsuperscript{40}

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{39} Governments may even accept IMF loans because they want to be subject to conditions or find having unpopular but ultimately necessary policies externally imposed optimal because it alleviates domestic opposition pressures. See James Raymond Vreeland, \textit{The IMF and Economic Development} (Cambridge University Press, 2003) and Allan Drazen, “Conditionality and Ownership in IMF Lending: A Political Economy Approach,” \textit{IMF Staff Papers} 49 (2002): 36–67.
  \item \textsuperscript{40} Emile M. Hafner-Burton, “Trading Human Rights: How Preferential Trade Agreements Influence Government Repression,” \textit{International Organization} 59, no. 3 (2005): pp. 593–629. A hard human rights clause ties agreement benefits to member compliance with specific human rights principles. While soft laws refer to voluntary cooperation and do not require changes in behavior in return for benefits, hard laws are legally
The power of EU conditionality lies in factors not generally found together in other conditional mechanisms, such as those employed by the IMF or the World Bank. First, the requirements are non-negotiable. Second, the benefits of EU membership are tremendous, ranging from political to sociocultural and economic; the costs of exclusion are accordingly severe. Third, the process itself comes with help; the EU financially supports the developments necessary to close the negotiation chapters and among those are improvements required for sufficient respect of Roma rights. Finally, as the EU reserves the greatest reward for the end, the process does not require retroactive sanctions. If a state is not protecting rights to a sufficient degree, instead of taking the promised benefit of membership away as punishment, the EU need not grant it in the first place.

When it comes to human rights, states tend to respond positively to conditionality. For example, when they sign Preferential Trade Agreements with hard human rights clauses, they generally follow through and better protect the physical integrity rights of their citizens. This study examines the effect of strong conditionality at a different level. It does not ask if the process of accession leads to better behavior regarding rights at the state level; that it does, at least to a degree, seems obvious as candidate states make commitments by signing the required human rights agreements and carry out policy and ground-level changes requested (and later evaluated) by the EU Commission. Instead, I ask if a strong binding obligations that are precise and that delegate authority for interpreting and implementing the law. For more, see Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal, “Hard and Soft Law in International Governance,” *International Organization* 54, no. 3 (2000): 421–456.

41. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism*.
42. Vachudova, *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism*.
43. For more, see Vachudova 2005, Chapters 3 and 5. It bears mentioning that given the current crisis situation, EU membership may not be as desirable as before. For the purposes of this study, however, this fact is less relevant as Croatia’s bid for membership began in 2003 and successfully concluded in 2011.
44. The program providing access to communal infrastructure and utilities to Romani settlements in Medjimurje (Croatia), in particular Sitnice, is a good example. See Phare, *Phare Project Fiche 2005: Roma Support Project, Croatia*, 2005.
46. Simmons shows that committing to human rights agreements is effective for states in transitional periods and leads to higher levels of respect for rights. See Beth A. Simmons, *Mobilizing for Human Rights: International Law in Domestic Politics*, 1st ed. (Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2009)
47. For an evaluation of the project in Sitnice mentioned in a previous footnote, see Instrument for Pre-
coercive mechanism can reliably reduce discrimination on the ground. In short, do the requirements put forth by the EU trickle down to affect individual behavior?

Demands for policy changes issued at the international level have an attenuated link to individual behavior. In the case of state capture and corruption, however, EU conditionality does appear to have effects that manifest themselves at the level of the individual. For example, some conditions of the Eastern Enlargements in 2004 and 2007 required a lowering of barriers to entry for new firms, which reduced the influence of powerful firms over the political process. The policy changes were quickly embraced and promoted by citizens who were not members of the existing elites; as a result, new domestic interest groups emerged, which then continued to support measures required by the EU well after the accession process was complete.48

Moreover, among the participants of this study, accession to the EU is an extremely salient political issue. When asked to identify the conditions for entry, 75 percent of the randomly sampled Croatian subjects knew that human rights49 were among them, and 44 percent pointed out minority rights specifically. In fact, respect for human rights was identified as a condition for entry more times than any other negotiation chapter; justice, freedom and security50 came as a close second, with 69 percent of participants identifying it as a requirement. It seems that Croats know that rights play a role in EU accession, but the extent to which that changes their behavior is less certain.

I initially hypothesized that the EU accession process, through its demands regarding human rights and its promise of the benefits of EU membership, reduces levels of discrimination as a form of diffusion. In-depth interviews with Roma rights experts confirmed and further refined my hypothesis; they claimed that the accession process only temporarily

50. Justice, freedom and security fall under Negotiations Chapter 24.
reduces discrimination, which returns once the process is complete and the state named a member of the EU.\textsuperscript{51} While the post-accession increase in discrimination is obviously not an occurrence that the EU supports, there is some merit to this claim. In trade agreements with clear and enforceable human rights requirements, benefits can be suspended in light of rights violations;\textsuperscript{52} a continuation of trade under favorable conditions is therefore a persistent incentive. Once a state becomes a member of the EU, in contrast, the incentive of membership is gone. The EU neither systematically monitors its member states with respect to rights protection nor enforces the standards it sets for candidate states.\textsuperscript{53}

Findings regarding backsliding on accession reforms are mixed: conditions on corruption, state capture,\textsuperscript{54} and some aspects of rule of law\textsuperscript{55} tend to have persistent effects, but requirements regarding politically salient EU law transpositions\textsuperscript{56} and the politicization of civil service\textsuperscript{57} do not. Respect for Roma rights is likely in the latter group. At the level of the individual, Levitz and Pop-Eleches attribute support for reforms and the resulting lack of backsliding to the exposure of citizens—through work, study, and travel—to the desired policies in place in Western European countries.\textsuperscript{58} Such positive exposure is much less likely in the context of Roma rights, however; instead of observing exemplary rights protection, citizens witness rights violations that range from refusing state entry to Roma visitors (United

\textsuperscript{51} Stano Daniel, interview by author; Djordje Jovanović, interview by author; Laco Oravec, interview by author; Brano Tichy, interview by author. Laco Oravec, a Romani rights activist and NGO worker, for example, said that “the pre-accession period was unique because of the strong requirements for Roma,” while Brano Tichy, director of Amnesty International in Slovakia, commented that “...accession is a great tool to push for changes, but the tool is not applied after the countries are in.”

\textsuperscript{52} See Hafner-Burton (2005), 609-614, for examples.

\textsuperscript{53} De Witte, “The Impact of Enlargement on the Constitution of the European Union”; Vachudova, \textit{Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism}.

\textsuperscript{54} Hollyer, “Conditionality, compliance, and domestic interests: State capture and EU accession policy.”


\textsuperscript{56} Antoaneta Dimitrova and Dimitar Toshkov, “Post-accession compliance between administrative coordination and political bargaining,” In Frank Schimmelfennig and Florian Trauner (eds.), Post-accession compliance in the EU’s new member states, \textit{European Integration online Papers} 13 (2009): 1–18.


\textsuperscript{58} Levitz and Pop-Eleches, “Why No Backsliding? The European Union’s Impact on Democracy and Governance Before and After Accession.”
Kingdom)\textsuperscript{59} to razing of settlements\textsuperscript{60} (Italy) and forced deportations (France).\textsuperscript{61}

With the absence of the previously strong conditionality and evidence of discrimination in old EU member states, the new members can take advantage of the double standard mentioned above and backslide in their respect for rights. The first hypothesis is therefore as follows:

\textbf{H1}: The EU accession process reduces ground level discrimination against the Roma; once a state becomes an EU member, however, discrimination increases.\textsuperscript{62}

To this test of a top-down strategy of rights improvement I add another, of a strategy that operates on the ground.

\textbf{Hypothesis II: NGO Action}

Human rights NGOs strive for change. They play a central role in transnational human rights advocacy,\textsuperscript{63} help local social movements and advocacy groups exert pressure from below,\textsuperscript{64} and inspire third parties, be they governments or international organizations, to join in the advocacy effort and apply pressure from above.\textsuperscript{65} NGO action, particularly


\textsuperscript{60}. European Roma Rights Centre et al., \textit{Security a la Italiana: Fingerprinting, Extreme Violence and Harassment of Roma in Italy} (Budapest, Hungary: Fo-Szer Bt., 2008).


\textsuperscript{62}. The hypothesis is further strengthened by the lack of support the experts showed for alternative factors that may have positively influenced the treatment of the Roma. Laco Oravec, for example, observed that governments and NGOs are not particularly interested in learning about effective policies from each other, while Stano Daniel was quietly cynical about democratization, citing post-accession campaigns against the Roma of certain right-wing political parties.


\textsuperscript{65}. Brysk, “From Above and Below: Social Movements, the International System, and Human Rights in Argentina.”
when coupled with third party or local engagement, can lead to changes in human rights domestically and transnationally. Much is accomplished through the mechanism of naming and shaming, which typically involves campaigns that inform domestic and international audiences of human rights infractions committed by governments and state actors, but that mechanism is not the only avenue for advocacy.

A subset of activities in which human rights NGOs may engage directly aims to reduce prejudice and discrimination by promoting interaction between members of groups that experience discrimination and members of groups that discriminate. The need to mobilize for change at the level of the individual is particularly salient in situations such as that of the Roma in many Central and Eastern European states, where discrimination is not state sanctioned but nonetheless happens on the ground. Scholarship on intergroup contact and prejudice, originally designed to capture the effects of contact on racial and ethnic prejudice, illustrates the potential benefits of Roma/non-Roma interaction.

For example, an early study of white housewives from racially segregated (black and white residents assigned to different buildings) and desegregated (residents assigned to apartments irrespective of race and personal preference) public housing projects in New York City and Newark showed that the women from the desegregated projects had more direct contact with their black neighbors, held their black neighbors in higher esteem, and expressed far more support for interracial housing. Decades later, contemporary research overwhelmingly shows that intergroup contact typically reduces prejudice. Intergroup anxiety, which

71. Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) find that while establishing Allport’s optimal conditions generally enhances the positive effects of contact, the conditions are not essential to show a significant relationship between
people feel when they are uncertain about how to act around members of the outgroup and worry about how they will be perceived,\textsuperscript{72} likely mediates the link between contact and prejudice. Lower levels of anxiety result in stronger positive contact effects;\textsuperscript{73} intergroup contact, in turn, can effectively reduce feelings of intergroup anxiety.\textsuperscript{74} Promoting Roma/non-Roma interaction in a non-threatening context may therefore be a key component in successfully reducing prejudice at the level of the individual.

If promoting Roma/non-Roma interaction reduces prejudice, might it reduce discrimination as well? Recent experimental\textsuperscript{75} and longitudinal\textsuperscript{76} analyses, as well as numerous previous studies,\textsuperscript{77} show that prejudice leads to discriminatory behavior, and that an increase in intergroup contact results in a decrease in both prejudice and discriminatory intent.\textsuperscript{78} Moreover, intergroup contact effects tend to generalize beyond participants in the immediate contact situation; people who experience contact may change their attitudes towards the entire outgroup, outgroup members in other situations, and even outgroups not involved in the contact situation at all.\textsuperscript{79} Extensive cross-national\textsuperscript{80} evidence on the relationship between contact, prejudice, and discrimination therefore suggests that efforts on the part of NGOs to increase contact between Roma and non-Roma at the local level may lead to a decrease in prejudice and discrimination. For more on the optimal conditions, see Gordon Willard Allport, \textit{The Nature of Prejudice} (Addison-Wesley, 1954).


\textsuperscript{78} Wagner, Christ, and Pettigrew, “Prejudice and Group-Related Behavior in Germany.”

\textsuperscript{79} Pettigrew and and, “A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory.”

\textsuperscript{80} See Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) for a meta-analysis.
in prejudice and discrimination at that level as well.

Entities and individuals who promote Roma rights in Europe today are a part of a massive transnational Roma rights advocacy network. The number of Roma NGOs in Europe has risen dramatically over the past two decades, and they have led the charge in Roma rights advocacy efforts. In the international and state milieux these efforts are remarkably visible. Organizations exclusively dedicated to the Roma cause—like the European Roma Rights Centre at the international level or Romani Criss in Romania at the state level—operate on multiple fronts, engaging in documentation of human rights abuses, research, strategic litigation, and advocacy. Human rights organizations that focus on rights generally, like Amnesty International, engage in advocacy and, most notably, naming and shaming. Local organizations, generally smaller in capacity, focus less on international initiatives and changes to law and policy, but vary in purpose. Many are dedicated to the general well-being of the Roma and aim to help them overcome obstacles they face in education, health care, legal and administrative matters, issues relating to infrastructure, and social services more generally. Others focus instead on Roma/non-Roma relations, aiming to create...

82. For an overview of the strategic priorities and actions of the European Roma Rights Centre, see www.eerc.org. For the same at Romani Criss, see romanicroiss.org.
83. See Amnesty International Slovakia at www.amnesty.sk.
84. See, for example, Cega (Bulgaria) at http://www.cega.bg/; Romi za Rome Hrvatske (Croatia); Chance for Children Foundation (Hungary) at http://www.cfcf.hu/; and Romaversitas (Macedonia) at http://www.romaversitas.edu.mk/.
85. See, for example, Drom (Czech Republic) at http://www.drom.cz/ and Daja - Roma Women Organization in Macedonia (Macedonia) at http://www.daja.org.mk/.
a friendly atmosphere where Roma and non-Roma can socialize, often through cultural and sporting events.\footnote{See, for example, Vzájemné Soužití (Czech Republic) at www.vzajemnesouziti.estranky.cz/clanky/onas-.html and L’udia Proti Rasizmu (Slovakia) at http://www.rasizmus.sk/;}

Local efforts are less visible internationally, and sometimes escape attention at the national level as well. Nonetheless, literature on contact, prejudice, and discriminatory intent would single out a subset of those as particularly relevant to reducing discrimination on the ground. To dramatically reduce discrimination at the level of the individual, I hypothesize that an organization is needed that thrives on the ground and tailors its actions to the people that surround it. Moreover, such an entity must promote Roma/non-Roma contact and hence include in its activities non-Roma as well as Roma. The second hypothesis is therefore as follows:

\textbf{H2:} Effective ground level organizing geared towards improving Roma/non-Roma relations reduces discrimination against the Roma.

It was impossible to test the two hypotheses without collecting original data. To avoid ethnic stereotyping, most Eastern European states no longer collect data based on ethnicity; if they do, the data are not available to the general public.\footnote{Stano Daniel, interview by author; Brano Tichy, interview by author; Marek Hojsík, Interview by author. Notes. Bratislava, 2010; Stepan Ripka, Interview by author. Notes. Prague, 2010.} Even the most basic population counts of Roma are grossly inconsistent: while rights activists tend to overestimate population counts,\footnote{Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics; European Roma Rights Centre, The Situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union.} official estimates are often too low, resulting in gaps as wide as 2.5 million people.\footnote{Romania. See Barany, The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics.} Since systematic and reliable cross-time quantitative data on Roma rights do not exist, I constructed an original measure of discrimination, described after the section on case selection.
Case Selection

I measured discrimination levels in two overlapping pairs of towns, one pair per hypothesis. While differing on the crucial covariate—EU accession process or inclusive Roma NGO activity,—the two town pairs match formidably on a set of factors that may influence human and Roma rights, at state, regional, and town levels. To select the towns I performed nearest neighbor matching, using relevant covariates, on all towns in Slovenia and Croatia that have not experienced war violence in the Yugoslav wars in the early 1990s and have a Roma population of at least 50. To test the two hypotheses with the lowest possible number of subjects, participants were recruited from three towns; data from one of these towns is therefore used to test both hypotheses. Matching singled out Čakovec in Croatia and Murska Sobota in Slovenia as the best pair to test Hypothesis 1; Murska Sobota and Novo mesto, also in Slovenia, were selected as the best pair to test Hypothesis 2 (see Figure 1 for a map). Since the three towns have shared characteristics, the remainder of this section first discusses the common factors and then examines each town pair separately.

[Figure 1 about here]

Factors Common to All Three Locations

The three towns share demographic and historical characteristics. The regions in which the towns are located have the highest percent of Romani inhabitants in their respective

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93. The covariates used in nearest neighbor matching were town population, Roma inhabitants as proportion of total population, ethnic majority as proportion of total population, proximity to Slovene/Croat border, a regional capital dummy, a tri-border region dummy (Hypothesis 1), and dummies for the EU accession process (Hypothesis 1) and inclusive Roma NGO action (Hypothesis 2). The pair of towns used to test Hypothesis 1 was selected first; the pair used to test Hypothesis 2 was selected second.


countries. Medjimurje in Croatia (Čakovec) and Prekmurje in Slovenia (Murska Sobota), rank first in the proportion of Roma, while Dolenjska in Slovenia (Novo mesto) ranks second. The three towns are regional capitals and have the largest Romani populations in their respective regions—Roma make up 3.59 percent of the population in Čakovec, 2.27 percent in Murska Sobota, and between 1.2 and 2.8 percent in Novo mesto. The towns are each about 10 miles away from the Slovene-Croat border, and are of comparable sizes, having between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants.

Each town has had a Roma population for at least 200 years. In each town, the vast majority of Roma live in one heavily Romani neighborhood, Kursanec in Čakovec, Pušča in Murska Sobota, and Brezje-Žabjak in Novo mesto; these neighborhoods are on the outskirts of the towns and are separated from the main town centers by a stretch of fields and some trees. The Roma are represented in the local governments and Romani NGOs are active in all three locations. Primary school curricula used in the towns do not cover the Roma; they mention neither their history nor their rights.

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96. The lower estimate is based on the 2002 census; a local source, Silvo Mesojedec, estimates the higher proportion (interview with author). Also see Statistični urad Republike Slovenije, “Popis prebivalstva,” 2002, http://www.stat.si.
98. The first recorded birth of a Romani child in Murska Sobota is from 1741, the first mention in Novo mesto was in 1812, and the first mention in Čakovec was in 1688. Romi Bajasi (ancestors of the current population in Čakovec) were first mentioned in Čakovec in 1860. For more, see Jožek Horvat-Muc, Romska Skupnost v Sloveniji: Zgodovina in Kultura Romov (Murska Sobota, Slovenija: Zveza Romov Slovenije, Romani Union, 2011) and Vugrinčič and Siladi, Iz života Roma: Kreativnost Roma, Doprinos Kulturi i Turizmu. This is of some importance because many locations throughout the former Yugoslavia have experienced an influx of Roma relatively recently, as some were displaced during the conflict in the 1990s. In some such locations the dynamics between Roma and non-Roma are different from those in locations where Roma are considered “indigenous” as the refugee population may have integrated far more successfully (Vera Klopčič, Interview by author. Voice recording. Ljubljana, 2012).
101. Dijana Vican and Ivan Milanović Litre, Nastavni Plan i Program za Osnovnu Školu (Zagreb: Ministarstvo znanosti, obrazovanja i športa, 2006); Pavla Karba, Program Osnovna Šola: Državljanska in Domovinska Vzgoja ter Etika (Ljubljana: Ministarstvo za šolstvo in šport, Zavod RS za šolstvo, 2010).
Hypothesis I: Čakovec, Croatia, and Murska Sobota, Slovenia

A meaningful study of discrimination in the context of EU accession and membership would necessarily span several years if limited to one country. To test Hypothesis I within a short time span, I looked at cross-sectional snapshots of towns that, although in different countries, match on the factors most relevant to Roma rights. The pressure to significantly improve Roma rights in the few years that span the accession process has been applied to almost all states of the Eastern Enlargements, including, most recently, Croatia. For reasons explained below, the cleanest and most compelling cross-national comparison to a town in Croatia is a town in its northern neighbor, Slovenia. Slovenia acceded to the EU in 2004 and, since accession, has experienced little pressure, if any, to improve its treatment of the Roma.102

At the end of June 2011, the EU closed negotiations for membership with Croatia; accession is foreseen for July 1st 2013.103 Chapter 23, the negotiation chapter most relevant to Roma rights, was among the last three to be closed;104 in early summer 2011, when Croatia was still reminded of the challenges faced by the Roma minority in the context of accession negotiations, this project was already in place. I was therefore able to capture people’s attitudes towards the Roma during a particularly critical period: when Croatia’s treatment of Roma rights was among the last few things keeping Croatia from the EU.105

While the two towns are located in different countries, they match nearly perfectly on the state and regional characteristics that most strongly influence human rights generally, and just as well on factors that tend to affect Roma rights specifically.

State level

102. Vachudova, Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, & Integration After Communism.
105. For a discussion on how significant progress tends to happen towards the end of the accession process, see Pridham, “The EU’s Political Conditionality and Post-Accession Tendencies: Comparisons from Slovakia and Latvia.”
First, Roma make up a nearly identical fraction of the population in both: 0.18 percent in Croatia and 0.19 percent in Slovenia.\(^{106}\)

Second, Slovenia and Croatia were a part of Yugoslavia for almost fifty years and together formed the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes before that. Yugoslavia’s policies regarding the Roma were at the time remarkably inclusive and constructive, especially when compared to those of the surrounding states. Yugoslav nationality and minority policy was based on the principle of tolerant ethnic harmony—federally enforced, when necessary.\(^{107}\) Tito’s government vastly preferred integration to assimilation, and Yugoslav Roma were able to organize socially and culturally relatively free of state control.\(^{108}\) Any comparison of Croatia with a non-Yugoslav state that would otherwise match well as a new democracy with a significant Roma population would need to account for a legacy of several tolerant decades. In Slovakia, for instance, assimilationist pressures resulted in a program offering sterilization to Romani women; in Bulgaria, Roma were forcefully sedenterized and prohibited from speaking Romani and dancing in public.\(^{109}\) In a comparison with Slovenia, in contrast, the relative civility of Yugoslav policies does not pose a confounding factor. The regime’s restrictions on general rights are not problematic either, since they applied across the Federation.\(^{110}\)

Third, both states are new Central European democracies and share the experience of transitioning from the same system, which includes the rise in intolerance towards the Roma that followed the demise of strict egalitarian Yugoslav policies.\(^{111}\) They are both parliamentary representative democratic republics.\(^{112}\)

\(^{106}\) The estimates are from the National Censuses. See Statistični urad Republike Slovenije, “Popis prebivalstva”; Republika Hrvatska - Državni Zavod za Statistiku, “Popis stanovništva, Kućanstava i Stanova.”

\(^{107}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.


\(^{109}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

\(^{110}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

\(^{111}\) Barany, *The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics*.

\(^{112}\) For more, please see entries on Slovenia and Croatia on PARLINE database on national parliaments; PARLINE database on national parliaments, “Entries on Slovenia and Croatia,” 2011, http://www.ipu.org/parline
Fourth, both states have either ratified or succeeded to all the core human rights treaties, and have membership in a comparable number of international NGOs: by January 2000, Croatia was a member of 1080 organizations and Slovenia a member of 1130.

Fifth, and perhaps most crucially, respect for Roma rights and the general circumstances of Roma existence were quite similar in the two states around the period before they began the accession process. Slovenia formally applied for membership in 1996; Croatia in 2003. Both governments adopted a program of measures intended to help the Roma; Slovenia in 1995 (supplemented by education-specific measures in 1996), and Croatia in 2003. With these programs the two countries focused especially on education. As they were not adequately proficient in Slovene or Croatian, younger Romani children from both countries faced significant difficulties in integrating with their non-Romani peers in schools; they had trouble following lessons as well. Klopčič observed this in Croatia around 2003, while Tancer observed it in Slovenia in early to mid-1990s. In neither country were the Roma recognized as a nation; they were, however, recognized as an ethnic minority in Slovenia in 1991 and as a national minority in Croatia in 2000. The Roma in both states were largely unemployed: in Slovenia in 1990 about 17 percent worked, while in Croatia in 2001 17.1 percent of Roma had a job. The vast majority of Roma in both countries lived

118. To date, the Roma have been recognized as a nation only in Macedonia. See Ivan Rumbak, Od Legenda do Povijesti, od Priča do Stvarnosti (Zagreb, Croatia: Print za vas, 2009).
120. Polzer-Sriend, “Romi in Evropska Intercacja: Primerjava Stanja v Sloveniji, Avstriji in na Hrvaškem.”
121. Mladen Tancer, Vzgoja in Izobraževanje Romov na Slovenskem (Maribor, Slovenia: Založba Obzorja Maribor, 1994).
in isolated settlements.\textsuperscript{123}

Finally, both Slovene and Croatian press in that time period presented Roma in a predominantly negative light, by using discriminatory language and by referring to alleged criminals as members of the Romani community and not as individuals.\textsuperscript{124} In the fall of 1997, major Slovene news sources were surveyed for mentions of the Roma. Of the 131 times the Roma appeared in the news in that time period, only once did the article report on a non-conflict situation.\textsuperscript{125} In Croatia in 2003, the Roma received more mentions than any other Croatian minority in the two newspapers with highest readership. In 2001, 27 percent of articles on national minorities had a sensationalistic discriminatory title; in 2003 the proportion was reduced to 18 percent.\textsuperscript{126}

\textit{Regional level}

The regions in which the towns are located, Prekmurje and Medjimurje, match even better than the countries do. First, the two regions are geographically close. Medjimurje in Croatia is located immediately to the south of Prekmurje in Slovenia; the regions share the river Mura and are separated only by the Slovene-Croat border.

Second, the GDPs per capita of Prekmurje and Medjimurje are closer than national Slovene and Croatian GDPs per capita; since Medjimurje is one of the most prosperous regions of Croatia and Prekmurje is the least prosperous region of Slovenia,\textsuperscript{127} the wealth

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{Romi}, ed. Maja Štambuk (Zagreb, Croatia: Institut društvenih znanosti Ivo Pilar, 2005), 35–53.
\item Erjavec, Hrvatin, and Kelbl, Mi o Romih: Diskriminatorski Diskurz v Medijih v Sloveniji. Interestingly, of all sources on articles or reports on the Roma, only 12.4 percent of the sources were Romani.
\item Kanižaj, “Predstavljenost Nacionalnih Manjina u Hrvatskim Dnevnim Novinama Komparativni Pregled 2001-2003.”
\end{itemize}
gap is dramatically reduced.

Finally, the two regions have additional common history: during the era of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, when many Roma were forcibly settled, they were both under the Hungarian rule. Located in the tri-border area between Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary, the regions have historically been highly ethnically diverse. This diversity resulted in an intriguing commonality: the dialects spoken in the two towns, though based on different languages, are quite similar. The subjects in both towns, for example, referred to money with the word “penezi,” which is neither Slovene nor Croatian but is derived from Hungarian.

Čakovec and Murska Sobota are only 20 miles apart, share an experience of over forty formative years for ethnic tolerance in the Balkans, and match exceptionally well on state-, regional-, and town-level factors that tend to affect human and Roma rights. The two towns are excellent candidates for a border study of the effects of the EU accession process.

Hypothesis II: Murska Sobota, Slovenia and Novo mesto, Slovenia

Testing Hypothesis II, on the other hand, utilizes a within-country design. National and EU laws regarding Roma rights are self-evidently the same in Novo mesto as in Murska Sobota, as are state level factors that may have historically shaped the relationship between Roma and non-Roma. The two towns see different types of Romani NGO action, however, and this discrepancy is instrumental to testing Hypothesis II, which claims that ground level Romani NGO action that aims to improve Roma/non-Roma relations and addresses non-Roma as well as Roma helps reduce discrimination at the level of the individual.

Roma NGO activity in Murska Sobota aims to improve Roma/non-Roma relations

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and is inclusive: it effectively engages the non-Roma just as much as it engages the Roma. Romani NGO activity in Novo mesto does not. For example, fairly early in its tenure Romani Union - Zveza Romov in Murska Sobota began organizing events that would improve local awareness and relations between Roma and non-Roma. Initially, it was challenging to convince local non-Roma that the events are intended for all, but the organization succeeded in 1992 with Ciganska noč (“Gypsy night”), an annual concert of Romani music and dances that traditionally evolves into a lively party. Once that barrier was breached, non-Roma began attending book launches, plays, workshops and the Romani summer camps as well. A sister organization runs a Romani radio, Radio Romic, and there, too, non-Roma listeners are invited to tune-in. Connecting Roma and non-Roma through culture and awareness is the organizations’ chief objective, which they have apparently attained. Not only do Roma and non-Roma attend the events together, but the number of non-Roma among event participants and radio listeners recently surpassed the number of Roma. As it connects Roma and non-Roma in a friendly, non-threatening context, Romani Union likely lowers Roma/non-Roma anxiety—doing precisely what recent literature on contact, intergroup anxiety, and prejudice finds particularly effective.

132. In 2000, Romani Union started a small, independent publishing house, which published local Romani fiction and non-fiction, a newspaper, and proceedings from conferences as well as recordings of music and Romani fairy tales. Several activists from Romani Union are members of the Romani Union amateur theater group and the Romani Union amateur folklore group. Each year since 1994 Romani Union has organized a week-long international Romani summer camp where Roma and non-Roma, children, professionals and activists can learn about Romani history, language, culture, and contemporary issues that affect Roma across the globe. For more, see Horvat-Muc, 20 let Romani Union Murska Sobota: 1990-2010.
133. An additional and possibly vital characteristic of organizing in Murska Sobota is that Roma and non-Roma are always presented as equal. Instead of generally proclaiming that the Roma need help, the organization demonstrates the ways in which, while equal, they are different and interesting. Entering the contact situation with equal status may additionally reduce bias. See James Moody, “Race, School Integration, and Friendship Segregation in America,” American Journal of Sociology 107 (2001): 679–716.
134. Monika Sandreli, interview by author.
135. Brown and Hewstone, “An integrative theory of intergroup contact”; Blair, Park, and Bachelor, “Un-
The most active organization in Novo mesto, in contrast, generally does not address relations between Roma and non-Roma. Romano Veseli has a very strong presence in the Romani communities and focuses on socio-economic aid provision and efforts related to education of both Romani children and adults.\textsuperscript{136} Aside from an occasional volunteer, non-Roma are not involved in the organization’s activities. The leading activist is well known and respected among the Roma in Novo mesto, however; every randomly sampled Romani subject who participated in the study was able to identify her by name and many profusely praised her efforts. The organization in Novo mesto is of somewhat lower capacity than that in Murska Sobota, but is growing.\textsuperscript{137}

As neither was randomly assigned, expansive inclusive organizing in Murska Sobota and somewhat less expansive non-inclusive organizing in Novo mesto suggest an omitted variable bias, namely the possibility that any difference in discrimination today and the scope and type of organizing in each town could be related to a difference in respect for Roma rights prior to organizing. Before Romani organizing began in Murska Sobota in early 1991,\textsuperscript{138} however, Roma in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto received very similar treatment. In fact, immediately before Slovene independence,\textsuperscript{139} relations between Roma and non-Roma in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto were as alike as they have ever been. Uniform and strict Yugoslav policies on minorities had by then been in effect for several decades, not only across Slovenia but across other Yugoslav republics as well.\textsuperscript{140} The two main settlements in both towns had Romani kindergartens.\textsuperscript{141} Romani primary school attendance in both towns was

\textsuperscript{136} Milena Tudija, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{137} Jožek Horvat-Muc, interview by author; Monika Sandreli, interview by author.

\textsuperscript{138} Horvat-Muc, 20 let Romani Union Murska Sobota: 1990-2010.

\textsuperscript{139} Slovenia declared independence on June 25th 1991.

\textsuperscript{140} Vanek Šiftar, “Romí Včeraj . . . Pojutrišnjem?” \textit{Znamenje} 2 (1989): 122–137. As previously mentioned, respect for minorities in Yugoslavia was paramount, but those identities gave way to unity; they “were a colorful nation . . . but all, including the Roma, Yugoslavians.” (Stane Baluh, interview by author).

low, especially in the higher grades.\textsuperscript{142} Due to employment policies centered on equality, Romani levels of employment in both towns were quite high during the 1980’s and much higher than during the transition period in the decade that followed.\textsuperscript{143} As the transition to market economy began, the Roma were among the first to lose jobs,\textsuperscript{144} partly due to low levels of education which were previously less of an obstacle to employment.\textsuperscript{145} Murska Sobota and Novo mesto began experiencing general unemployment particularly early.\textsuperscript{146} In both towns protection of socio-economic rights as well as the relative standard of living were higher during the Yugoslav times than during the transition that followed\textsuperscript{147} and possibly at their peak during the late 1980’s.

While several decades of unified policies on minorities and, more importantly, of equality in employment imposed upon all citizens do not guarantee that attitudes towards the Roma in the early 1990’s were the same in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto, they do weaken the threat of omitted variable bias. In addition, interview evidence suggests that the reason behind expansive organizing in Murska Sobota is that the Roma themselves found it easier to work together there,\textsuperscript{148} and did not scatter as much upon becoming educated.\textsuperscript{149}

To establish the extent to which the general population of each town is familiar with Romani organizing, I added questions about NGOs to the exit survey given to participants

\textsuperscript{142} Šiftar, “Romi Včeraj . . . Pojutrišnjem?”; Tancer, “Romi v Sloveniji.”
\textsuperscript{143} Dušica Balazek, interview by author; Vera Klopičič, interview by author, 2012. In some companies, specific minority quotas were in effect (Klopičič).
\textsuperscript{144} Šiftar, “Romi Včeraj . . . Pojutrišnjem?”; Dušica Balazek, interview by author; Vera Klopičič, interview by author, 2012.
\textsuperscript{146} Šiftar, “Romi Včeraj . . . Pojutrišnjem?”
\textsuperscript{147} Milena Tudija, interview by author.
\textsuperscript{148} Generally, the Roma tend to fragment along clan and family lines (Barany, \textit{The East European Gypsies: Regime Change, Marginality, and Ethnopolitics}; Vera Klopičič, interview by author, 2012). Those from Novo mesto arrived in several waves and some of the divisions originating from that persist despite the fact that the Roma have been in the region for over 200 years (Klopičič). In Murska Sobota, on the contrary, only one division seems to be relevant, meaning that one side of the divide is large enough to provide enough people to run and staff the organization (Anton Štihec, Interview by author. Notes. Murska Sobota, 2011 ).
\textsuperscript{149} Vera Klopičič, interview by author, 2012. In Romani communities across Central and Eastern Europe educated Roma often choose to ‘assimilate’ completely into the majority population and no longer identify as Roma; in many cases they are also rejected by the community and have no choice but to leave (Eva Salnerova, interview by author). In recent years this trend has begun to change as more young educated Roma remain involved with their communities (Salnerova).
in Novo mesto. For comparison, the same questions were asked of 100 randomly chosen individuals in Murska Sobota.\textsuperscript{150} Forty-six percent of randomly surveyed individuals in Murska Sobota were familiar with local Romani organizations. In Novo mesto, only two percent of senders were familiar with the same.\textsuperscript{151} This finding confirms the expectation from comparing types of organizing in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto: activism in Murska Sobota reaches almost every other individual from the non-Roma population, whereas activism in Novo mesto—understandably—reaches only a few. In testing the effectiveness of organizing at the ground level, Novo mesto is therefore a suitable counterpart to Murska Sobota.

**Methodology**

**Games**

Between the summers of 2011 and 2012, I collected data to construct an original measure of discrimination at the ground level dimension of everyday relationships between Roma and non-Roma in Čakovec, Murska Sobota, and Novo mesto. The measure focuses on only one of many dimensions in which discrimination occurs, discrimination at the level of the individual. Rights violations that Roma may experience in seeking employment or health care, in detention or in prison are not directly recorded in my data. The measure does, however, capture the basic, visceral, and quotidien discrimination upon which other violations are frequently based.

Data on discrimination were collected through simple games that have been shown to demonstrate risk preferences and other-regarding behavior. The games measured (1)

\textsuperscript{150} The NGO questions were unfortunately not included on the original exit survey in Murska Sobota. \textsuperscript{151} Thirty-three percent of senders indicated that they knew of a Romani NGO; only eighteen percent were able to name an entity and only two percent in fact named a relevant organization. The municipal office for social benefits was the most commonly named “NGO” that dealt with Roma issues. I exclude the mentions of two organizations in reporting the data. The first is a volunteer work organization (Drustvo za razvoj prostovoljnega dela) that, among other things, also works with the Roma but is neither staffed by Roma nor primarily concerned with Roma issues. Six percent of senders mentioned this organization. The second is Civilna iniciativa, which is an initiative formed by non-Roma that aims to resolve the “Roma question.” It was evident that the senders who mentioned Civilna iniciativa understood it to be an organization that does not fight for Roma rights but rather to protect the non-Roma from the (actual or perceived) negative consequences of living close to the Roma settlement. Two percent of senders named that organization.
risk preferences (lottery), altruism (dictator game), trust in one’s community members (trust game), and trustworthiness with respect to one’s community members (trust game). The chief rationale for using the games was the difficulty of measuring individual levels of discrimination. People may not admit to racist preferences if asked directly; in fact, participants in both Croatia and Slovenia often agreed to participate on the grounds that no personal questions would be asked, but did not mind the game set-up.

Briefly, the lottery revealed a subject’s willingness to gamble. A subject was given a choice between five lotteries, ranging from one with no risk to one with high risk. The expected value of all the lotteries was the same. The subject picked which one she preferred and so revealed her willingness to gamble for a higher return.

The dictator game revealed a subject’s level of altruism. A subject was given an endowment and asked to decide how much of it to keep for herself and how much to donate to a needy family in her community. The name of the family or any other characteristics were not revealed. The subject divided the sum; the amount donated measures the level of altruism.

In the trust game subjects were assigned to play the role of a sender or a receiver

156. While the trust game involves an actual interaction between two people, it is nonetheless a simulation of a real-life situation. Whether the game captures discriminatory intent or merely prejudice may be up for debate, but the issue is not dispositive. Both experimental (Dovidio 2004) and longitudinal (Wagner 2008) analyses demonstrate that the two are closely connected, and that prejudice is causally linked to discriminatory behavior.
and were then randomly and anonymously paired with a partner. Both sender and receiver began the game with an identical endowment. The sender chose how much of the endowment to share with the receiver, knowing that the amount sent would be doubled and that the receiver would have the chance to return to the sender a portion of his total amount. The doubled amount was then given to the receiver. The receiver decided how much of his total amount—that is, his initial endowment plus the doubled amount—to send back. The amount sent was used as a measure of trust and the amount returned as a measure of trustworthiness. Subjects were randomly paired to play the trust game with an anonymous randomly chosen Roma or non-Roma partner from their community. The treatment was delivered in person: subjects were told that their partner was randomly chosen and anonymous, either Roma or non-Roma, and that there would be no direct interaction with the partner. Whether the participant received a treatment or a control condition was determined beforehand, with a coin toss. Subjects’ decisions in the dictator and trust games were confidential and made in private.

The trust game played for a monetary sum is exceptionally suitable as a measure of discrimination because negative stereotypes and general dislike of the Roma are largely based on distrust regarding money. Roma are often stereotyped as thieves and beggars; they

158. Partners never met. Trust game pairs were determined through identifier cards that subjects drew in the beginning—the receiver was paired with the sender who had drawn the same identifier from a collection of cards. The subjects were instructed to keep their identifier hidden; the examiners knew neither who drew what identifier nor who was paired with whom.

159. The subjects were instructed to place the amount of money they wished to send to the family in need (dictator) or their partner (trust) in an empty envelope, which they then sealed, marked only with their identifier, and put in the appropriate ballot box (green box for dictator, blue box for trust). They were instructed to put the money they wished to keep in their pocket or in an envelope we provided, which they kept hidden. The examiners made sure that the instructions were well understood, left the room, and re-entered only when the subject confirmed that she had placed the envelope in the appropriate ballot box and the remaining money in her pocket/hidden envelope. For more detail, see the protocols in the online Appendix.

160. The expected total payoff from the three games, for one subject, was approximately 60% of a daily wage, in Slovenia approximately the equivalent of €16 and in Croatia of 106 kuna.

have historically been accused even of stealing children. The trust game was well received in the Romani communities; Romani activists from Slovenia and Croatia thought that the game was an appropriate and ingenious way of capturing the sentiment that motivates much discrimination at the personal level.

The primary quantity of interest was the difference between the trust that non-Roma exhibited in interactions with Roma and that which they exhibited in interactions with non-Roma. The lottery and the dictator game were included to control for characteristics that likely influence subjects’ responses in the trust game and might confound the results. A highly altruistic person may, for example, offer more money in the trust game, but not necessarily because she trusts her potential partner. Likewise a risk-loving person might offer a large sum because of the thrill, not trust.

Non-Roma subjects participated individually, in their homes. Roma subjects participated individually in several central locations, including an NGO common room, a kindergarten, and several homes. Participation generally lasted between 10 and 20 minutes.

Participation began with reading and signing the consent form, continued with the three games, and concluded with a short exit survey. The survey asked general questions concerning the age, gender, education, income bracket, the nationality and ethnicity of the participant, as well as two questions on the EU accession process. Participants were asked if they had heard about this study or the games before; if they answered yes, they were asked to specify when and in what context. If they heard about the games from a person who had

162. Hancock, *We are the Romani People*.
163. Conversations with staff at Romani Union-Zveza Romov, a Roma NGO in Murska Sobota; Interview with Željko Balog; conversation with interested Roma in the Sitnice settlement (8 men).
166. While they were unwilling to come to a central location, mostly blaming the inconvenience of travel, non-Roma subjects quite willingly participated in their homes. Romani subjects, on the other hand, were much more comfortable participating in a central location.
participated, they were removed from the sample.\textsuperscript{167}

**Stratified Random Sampling**

The random population sample consisted of 202 subjects from each town.\textsuperscript{168} Simple random sampling was used to draw participants from the two strata, the non-Roma general population and the Roma general population. The Roma community was oversampled because it is substantially smaller. All streets in the town or the Romani settlement were numbered and re-ordered based on a random number sample. Participants were recruited from the chosen streets - one person from each house, with a systematic iteration between genders.\textsuperscript{169} Any individual over the age of 18 was eligible to participate in the study. The response rate was approximately 60 percent.\textsuperscript{170} In total, 606 people from the general population participated in the games, 202 from each town.\textsuperscript{171}

**Results**

As this paper discusses levels of discrimination against the Roma in Slovenia and Croatia, I am here concerned only with the behavior of the subjects who were senders in the

\textsuperscript{167} Only two people had heard about the study (one had a friend who had participated and the other heard about the study from her husband, who learned about it from a friend); they were both excluded from the analysis.

\textsuperscript{168} For a moderate effect size (around 0.25) and a power of 0.8, I required 50 subjects per treatment to find a statistically significant difference at the 5 percent level. This demanded 200 subjects per town: 100 non-Roma senders of which half were paired with 50 non-Roma receivers and half with 50 Roma receivers. For more, see Jacob Cohen, *Statistical Power Analysis for Behavioral Sciences* (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1988).

\textsuperscript{169} As the streets are relatively short, we did not encounter trouble with contagion; only two people were removed from the sample.

\textsuperscript{170} Research teams attempted recruiting at a house on a selected street three times. Reports on average response rates from various surveys administered by the Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia confirm that a response rate of 60 percent is not unusually low; the office reports response rates that generally range from 60 to 80 percent and vary with the topic of the survey for which participants are recruited. See, for example, Lenart Lah, Katja Rutar, and Irena Svetin, “Trg dela: Labour market,” in Statistične Informacije: Rapid Reports, ed. Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 11 (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 2011), 1–23 and Matija Remec, “Življenjska raven: Level of living,” in Statistične Informacije: Rapid Reports, ed. Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 21 (Ljubljana, Slovenia: Statistični Urad Republike Slovenije, 2005), 1–10. I thank Matej Divjak (Statistical Office of the Republic of Slovenia) for his consultation regarding response rates.

\textsuperscript{171} Two people decided to withdraw from the study shortly after participating, one from Murska Sobota and one from Čakovec.
trust game—in total, 303 randomly chosen individuals. Table 1 summarizes key variables for senders. Based on the activists’ claims, Hypothesis I posited lower levels of discrimination in Čakovec, at the height of the EU accession process, than in Murska Sobota, part of an EU member state. I found the opposite. Average treatment effects and results from a generalized linear model indicate that people from Murska Sobota do not discriminate against the Roma, but that people from Čakovec do. Hypothesis II predicted higher levels of discrimination in Novo mesto, where Roma NGO organizing is not inclusive, than in Murska Sobota, where it is. The findings support this hypothesis: average treatment effects and results from a generalized linear model indicate that while people from Murska Sobota do not discriminate against the Roma, people from Novo mesto do.

[Table 1 about here]

The main quantity of interest—the dependent variable in the model—is the amount participants sent to their respective partners in the trust game. As the currencies in which participants were playing were not the same, the relevant variables (amounts sent in trust and dictator games) are coded as proportions of total endowment. Thus, if upon receiving the endowment of €6 a participant decided to send the €6 to their partner, the participant was assigned a value of 1 in the trust variable.

Figure 2 presents the average proportion of total trust game endowment that senders in each town sent to Roma and non-Roma partners. The average treatment effect is negligible in the case of Murska Sobota, where senders on average sent 57 percent of their endowment to non-Roma and 58 percent to Roma partners, a statistically insignificant difference-in-means. The average treatment effect in Čakovec, on the other hand, is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. Senders there sent 75 percent of endowment to non-Roma and 65 percent to Roma partners. Finally, senders from Novo mesto on average sent 73 percent of endowment to non-Roma and 59 percent to Roma partners. The average treatment effect in Novo mesto is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level. The absence of a significant
average treatment effect in Murska Sobota and the presence of one in Čakovec and Novo mesto indicate that senders from Murska Sobota did not discriminate against their Romani partners, while senders from Čakovec and Novo mesto did.

Curiously, senders from Čakovec and Novo mesto on average sent more to their partners than did senders from Murska Sobota. Similarly, in the dictator game senders from Murska Sobota sent significantly less to the anonymous local family in need than did senders from Čakovec and Novo mesto (on average donating 70, 87, and 83 percent of their endowment, respectively). This discrepancy suggests a higher average level of social capital in Čakovec and Novo mesto. Nonetheless, the people there appear to discriminate.

Regression analysis provides further insight. The appropriate specification for a model in which the dependent variable is a proportion is a generalized linear model with the binomial variance and the logit link function. To estimate the treatment effect, the model includes interaction terms between the control function and the treatment variable (Roma). Since partner ethnicity in the trust game was randomly assigned within each town, the observations were accordingly weighted.

Table 2 presents results from the model that includes the lottery chosen, the proportion of the endowment sent to the family in need in the dictator game, town dummies, and the

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172. The difference between Murska Sobota and Čakovec is statistically significant at the $p < 0.01$ level; the difference between Murska Sobota and Novo mesto is statistically significant at the $p < 0.05$ level.
174. All the control covariates are interacted with the treatment variable. For more information, see page 116 in Morton and Williams, *Experimental Political Science and the Study of Causality: From Nature to the Lab*.
175. As each town was treated as a block, each treated observation (sender partnered with a Roma receiver) was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in its block (town) who were assigned to the treatment condition and each control subject was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in its block who were assigned to the control condition. For more, see Alan S. Gerber and Donald P. Green, *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation* (New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Company, 2012).
176. Behavior in the dictator game (family in need) was a strong predictor of behavior in the trust game. Plots on predicted mean proportion of endowment sent in the trust game, for both the lottery chosen and
main population controls—age group, gender, education level and income bracket—as well as the interaction effects between these covariates and the treatment (Roma) as independent variables.\textsuperscript{177} The interaction term of Roma and Čakovec is negative and statistically significant, again suggesting that Croats from Čakovec discriminate against the Roma.\textsuperscript{178} Similarly, the interaction term of Roma and Novo mesto is negative and statistically significant, also suggesting that people from Novo mesto discriminate against the Roma.\textsuperscript{179}

Conditional marginal effects demonstrate the effect on the predicted mean proportion of the total endowment sent in the trust game as partner ethnicity changes from non-Roma to Roma.\textsuperscript{180} The marginal effect for Murska Sobota is not statistically significant: essentially, there is no evidence that a randomly chosen sender from Murska Sobota would send any less or any more to a Roma partner than she would to a non-Roma partner. In Čakovec, on the other hand, the change in the proportion of the endowment sent is statistically significant at the \( p < 0.01 \) level. A randomly chosen sender from Čakovec would send about 30 percent less to a Roma partner than to a non-Roma partner. The marginal effect is also statistically significant in the case of Novo mesto. There, too, a randomly chosen sender would on average send 30 percent less to a Roma partner \((p < 0.01)\).

Unexpectedly, participants from Novo mesto offered unsolicited statements regarding the Roma. In most cases the statements were given after or during the exit survey; a few

\begin{itemize}
  \item 177. Numerous iterations of the model were run, with various numbers and combinations of control variables. The findings are robust to all additions. Since I was a member of one of the two person research teams that conducted the games, some iterations included a variable controlling for my presence in the research team. This control variable is consistently insignificant. All results available upon request.
  \item 178. The statistically significant coefficient of the Roma \( \times \) Čakovec interaction term also demonstrates that the differences between the respective treated and control groups in the two towns are significantly different from each other (difference-in-differences).
  \item 179. The results presented here are from a model in which observations from the three towns were pooled. Findings from analyses where the relevant towns are compared in pairs (Čakovec and Murska Sobota, and Murska Sobota and Novo mesto) are substantively unchanged and available upon request.
  \item 180. The conditional marginal effects were calculated with all control covariates held at their means.
\end{itemize}

[Table 2 about here]
participants commented on the Roma during the trust game. One participant, tellingly, mistook a research team for a pair of Roma going door to door asking for money. We received comments from senders paired with Roma and non-Roma alike; whether or not they were assigned the treatment had no effect on the substance of the comments. Thirty-six percent of senders made unsolicited comments; one percent was positive, eleven percent were neutral and twenty-four percent were negative. The most remarkable comment included a half-joking threat that “we will send a couple of bus-loads of our Roma to your hometown and you’ll see what it’s like.” Unsolicited statements were not nearly as common in the other two towns. In Murska Sobota, one subject remarked upon receiving the treatment that she did not see why it would matter that her partner was a Roma or a non-Roma. In Čakovec we received three negative comments; the most remarkable, “The hell will he send,” referred to the possibility that a Romani partner may return some of the endowment to his partner in the trust game.\textsuperscript{181}

Two concerns arise in light of these findings. First, senders from Čakovec and Novo mesto might have sent less to Roma partners because the Roma in Čakovec and Novo mesto are actually less likely to reciprocate in such a context, compared to the Roma in Murska Sobota. A comparison of responses by Romani receivers, however, indicates that this is not the case. There is no statistically significant difference between what the Roma from all three locations returned to their partners, as a proportion of the total pot. The Roma played consistently.

Second, the non-random assignment of the type of organizing in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto also suggests a possible endogeneity problem, namely that the activists from both towns might have chosen their respective foci because they believed that those would be effective while any others would be ineffective in their respective towns. Extensive interviews with the leading activists, however, suggest that this is not the case. Activists in Murska

\textsuperscript{181} A closer comparison of the behavior of senders in the two towns that discriminate reveals no significant difference in the levels of discrimination against the Roma. The results of a generalized linear model on data from Čakovec and Novo mesto are available upon request.
Sobota focus strongly on Roma/non-Roma relations because they are themselves passionate about the issue and have been so from the very start. Likewise, activists in Novo mesto focus on providing socio-economic and educational aid because they believe it to be by far the most important cause. Interview evidence does not resolve the endogeneity problem, but does mitigate it.

These findings have three implications. First, the EU accession process does not necessarily lower discrimination such that it will be lower in an accessing state than in an EU member. Second, discrimination can be remarkably low, even absent, in an EU member state. Third and finally, inclusive organizing that aims to improve Roma/non-Roma relations helps reduce ground level discrimination.

A few caveats are in order. Crucially, the findings do not assess the absolute ground level effect of the EU accession process. The sample does not include observations from a location that has not yet been affected by the accession process or one that is entirely outside the purview of the EU. Without such a baseline, an evaluation of the efficacy of the process as a whole is nearly impossible to make. Therefore, while the findings demonstrate that the EU accession process does not necessarily lower ground level discrimination below that in an EU member, they do not address the claim that the EU accession process as a whole is ineffective in reducing ground level discrimination against the Roma.

Next, while the results demonstrate that discrimination can be remarkably low in an EU member state, this is not universally the case. It is abundantly clear that many Roma who live in EU member states, Eastern and Western, do not consistently enjoy enviable rights and equal treatment. At the state level, the treatment of immigrant Romani populations by Sarkozy—and recently Hollande—was self-evidently intolerant, as are Italy’s

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182. Jožek Horvat-Muc, interview by author; Monika Sandreli, interview by author.
183. Milena Tudija, interview by author.
efforts to destroy makeshift dwellings in settlements outside Milan. Hateful acts inspired by personal bigotry range from creating fictional administrative barriers that impede obtaining social benefits to participating in impromptu or planned demonstrations that usually take place in Romani settlements and frequently involve Molotov cocktails. To this collection of specific events, this study adds statistically significant evidence that ground-level discrimination can still exist within EU member states, and that it varies within countries, likely at the town level.

Finally, the results do not ensure that we would observe the same effect of inclusive Roma organizing throughout the EU space or beyond it, or that we would observe the same if inclusive organizing were randomly assigned. They also do not speak conclusively to the degree of a direct link between the EU and Roma organizing. Roma issues are a high priority within the EU space; the EU organizes and supports countless agendas and programs dedicated to improving Romani lives, offers grants to Romani NGOs in member states, and funds settlement infrastructure projects in candidate states. In the context of violence against women, the combination of local autonomous feminist activism and regional or international normative mechanisms is remarkably effective at spurring change. Drawing on

186. European Roma Rights Centre et al., *Security a la Italiana: Fingerprinting, Extreme Violence and Harassment of Roma in Italy.*
193. For an example of such a project see Phare, *Phare Project Fiche 2005: Roma Support Project, Croatia; Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance, IPA 2008 Croatia Project Fiche: Roma Support Project - Phase III.*
that, and considering the depth of EU involvement in the transnational Roma advocacy network, possible EU effects cannot be ruled out. Activists and experts from Slovenia—Murska Sobota, Novo mesto, and Ljubljana—however, are divided on the depth and importance of the EU in local organizing. Some claim that the EU plays a strong role in motivating activists, while others maintain that its role is negligible. Whether or not the EU, in any form, is the primary driver behind the observed lack of discrimination is at present uncertain, and more work is required to clarify that relationship. In the meantime, the absence of animus in Murska Sobota is striking.

This finding best speaks to the literature on the promotion of human rights norms. It reveals possible efficacy of a strategy currently not central to the theoretical framework of norms promotion; instead of focusing on naming and shaming, which has rightfully received much scholarly attention, I focus here on norms promotion through activities that soften the public mood and reduce inter-group anxiety. That is not to say that typical naming and shaming efforts, quite visible at national and international levels, are ineffective in this

195. Tahirovic


198. I was unable to obtain records of financial support given to the NGOs in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto. Neither the activists nor the Slovene Office for National Minorities were forthcoming with the information.


context. The difference in discrimination levels in the three towns, however, suggests that without very particular ground level action these efforts were insufficient. Indeed, inclusive organizing on the ground in Murska Sobota may be seen as a variant of local action taking a cross-national norm and adapting it to the local environment.\textsuperscript{203}

This result thus contributes to scholarship that establishes the necessity of a local presence in norms promotion,\textsuperscript{204} and offers a clarification: not just any type of organizing will do. That does not mean that the only type of local action that helps improve human rights is inclusive organizing; rather, it means that local action ought to be tailored to its target audience. In this case, the actors expected to change, via inclusive organizing, were individuals; naming and shaming, on the other hand, typically targets states and state actors.

Focusing on the behavior of individuals, this finding also bears upon literature in psychology on contact, prejudice, and discrimination. Crucially, and unlike those in many psychological studies, the subjects in this study were not treated with direct contact during the course of participation. The study instead offers an assessment of long-term intergroup contact—as it develops naturally on the ground—as a measure intended to reduce discrimination, and so provides a link between scores of convincing results from inter-group interactions in laboratory settings and theories of human rights norm promotion.

Conclusion and implications for future work

This study first tests the received wisdom that the EU accession process dramatically reduces discrimination against the Roma, which may rise again once the candidate state becomes a member of the EU. Not only is this hypothesis, the first half in particular, paradigmatic of an incentive-based understanding of rights change in international relations


literature, it is also championed by scholars of the EU accession process and experts on Roma rights in Central and Eastern Europe. My result that finds no support for this hypothesis is therefore surprising. Non-Roma from Čakovec, who were expected to discriminate comparatively little or not at all, did in fact discriminate—even as they were aware that respect for human rights is a necessary condition for EU accession. In turn, non-Roma from Murska Sobota who had not been exposed to EU pressure regarding Roma rights for over 8 years treated Roma no differently than non-Roma. That the effects of an incentive-based rights change mechanism as powerful as the EU accession process did not appear to trickle down to the ground level is a sobering finding. It cautions against unconditionally relying on state and international-level rights change measures—powerful as they may be in their own right—to affect violations at the personal level.

The second hypothesis states that ground level organizing geared towards improving Roma/non-Roma relations helps reduce discrimination. A within-country test provided initial evidence in its favor. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, where expansive inclusive Roma NGO action reaches almost every other non-Roma individual, did not discriminate against the Roma; non-Roma from Novo mesto, not having been targeted by expansive inclusive organizing over the past 15 years but having otherwise lived in an environment quite similar to that in Murska Sobota, discriminated against the Roma. This finding suggests that another powerful mechanism of rights change exists and provides a possible answer to the puzzle of observing rights violations in EU member states that seem to fly in the face of EU’s efforts to eliminate discrimination against the Roma. The evidence supports the idea that the promotion of norms can help decrease discrimination, with the related requirement of an entity on the ground that directly engages the majority population. In the case of Novo mesto, the absence of such an entity was linked to less success in lowering discrimination, even as the transnational Roma advocacy network remained quite present at the international and state levels.

The findings from Murska Sobota and Novo mesto provide solid initial support for
the second hypothesis, but many issues remain to be explored. Is the effect of ground level organizing observed in Murska Sobota generalizable? Would we observe a similar effect if the treatment of local level organizing or a simulation thereof were randomly assigned? To what extent is the EU primarily responsible for the observed decrease in discrimination? Would non-Roma from a town entirely outside the purview of the EU discriminate against the Roma? Would non-Roma from such a town exhibit non-discriminatory attitudes if the town had strong local level organizing like that in Murska Sobota?

As the EU plays a central role in supporting the transnational Roma advocacy network, decoupling the effects of organizing from the influence of the EU would be a particularly challenging task. Even as that remains unresolved, however, the findings speak against the pessimism with which NGOs are often viewed. I posit here that some NGOs can be effective in reducing discrimination, at least in certain settings. Although derived from one specific context, my findings could have implications for lowering discrimination against other socially disadvantaged groups elsewhere, ranging from immigrant populations in Europe to members of LGBT communities in Africa.205

Further, they offer an answer to the question of what the international community can do to promote human rights and fight discrimination: rights can be increased not only through legal mandates, but also through the promotion of norms. Beyond the findings presented here, this study provides original data to a field that often laments its scarcity. With respect to the Roma, this study helps illuminate the relationships between people of Europe’s largest ethnic minority and of two European nationalities, and so demonstrates the potential of inter-ethnic cooperation that offers more than the popular stories of the ‘gypsies,’ their criminality, and their plight.

205. Among other populations for which these findings might have implications are, as mentioned, persons of African descent in numerous Central and Latin American countries, Jews in Argentina, Uzbeks in Tajikistan, the San in Namibia, Turks in Germany and Greece, Hungarians in Slovakia, Russians in Uzbekistan, Poles in Belarus, Koreans in Japan, Aboriginals in Australia, and indigenous populations in Guatemala, El Salvador, Bolivia, and Paraguay.
Figure 1: A map of the three towns.
Figure 2: The average proportion of total endowment sent to partner in the trust game, by town and partner’s ethnic identity. The difference-in-means or average treatment effect is statistically significant where marked.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Number of observations</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Standard Deviation</th>
<th>Minimum</th>
<th>Maximum</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Paired with Roma receiver (treatment)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.51</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of endowment sent to trust game partner</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.65</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lottery chosen (1 - no risk, 5 - high risk)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>2.97</td>
<td>1.31</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lottery payoff (as proportion of expected value)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>1.03</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Proportion of endowment sent to family in need (dictator game)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>0.30</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age group 1(18-24), 2(25-35), 3(36-49), 4(50-64), 5(65+)</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>3.30</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woman</td>
<td>302</td>
<td>0.59</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income bracket (1-lowest, 3-highest)</td>
<td>282</td>
<td>1.68</td>
<td>0.69</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education level (1-primary school, 2-secondary, 3-college, 4-post-graduate)</td>
<td>300</td>
<td>2.38</td>
<td>0.67</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary nationality (1-Slovene in Slovenia, Croatian in Croatia; 0-otherwise)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.97</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary ethnicity (1-Slovene in Slovenia, Croatian in Croatia; 0-otherwise)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.92</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murska Sobota (101 senders)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čakovec (101 senders)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo mesto (101 senders)</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.47</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human rights identified as a requirement for EU accession (senders from Čakovec only)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.83</td>
<td>0.37</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority rights identified as a requirement for EU accession (senders from Čakovec only)</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.44</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Author present in research team</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>0.61</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 2: Effect of game partner ethnicity (Roma or non-Roma) in Croatia and Slovenia on the amount sent in the trust game - generalized linear model with weighted data

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Independent variables</th>
<th>Coefficients</th>
<th>Standard errors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Roma dummy</td>
<td>-0.301</td>
<td>0.993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čakovec</td>
<td>0.603 **</td>
<td>0.260</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Čakovec x Roma</td>
<td>-1.122 ***</td>
<td>0.413</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo mesto</td>
<td>0.592 **</td>
<td>0.289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Novo mesto x Roma</td>
<td>-1.135 ***</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 2 dummy</td>
<td>0.106</td>
<td>0.380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 3 dummy</td>
<td>0.254</td>
<td>0.351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 4 dummy</td>
<td>0.483</td>
<td>0.400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 5 dummy</td>
<td>0.312</td>
<td>0.417</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 2 x Roma</td>
<td>-0.012</td>
<td>0.552</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 3 x Roma</td>
<td>-0.149</td>
<td>0.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 4 x Roma</td>
<td>-0.334</td>
<td>0.546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>lottery 5 x Roma</td>
<td>0.514</td>
<td>0.652</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proportion sent to family in need</td>
<td>2.573 ***</td>
<td>0.454</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>proportion sent to family x Roma</td>
<td>1.063 *</td>
<td>0.591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>0.219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman x Roma</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>0.329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (25-35)</td>
<td>-1.119 *</td>
<td>0.611</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (36-49)</td>
<td>-0.653</td>
<td>0.576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (50-64)</td>
<td>-0.511</td>
<td>0.604</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (65+)</td>
<td>-0.718</td>
<td>0.602</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (25-35) x Roma</td>
<td>0.948</td>
<td>0.788</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (36-49) x Roma</td>
<td>0.567</td>
<td>0.737</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (50-64) x Roma</td>
<td>1.304 *</td>
<td>0.762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age (65+) x Roma</td>
<td>1.346 *</td>
<td>0.767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income bracket 2</td>
<td>0.051</td>
<td>0.253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income bracket 3</td>
<td>0.910 **</td>
<td>0.437</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income bracket 2 x Roma</td>
<td>-0.412</td>
<td>0.386</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>income bracket 3 x Roma</td>
<td>-0.937</td>
<td>0.640</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary education</td>
<td>-0.144</td>
<td>0.409</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college education</td>
<td>-0.258</td>
<td>0.438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-graduate education</td>
<td>-0.680</td>
<td>0.768</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secondary education x Roma</td>
<td>-0.762</td>
<td>0.707</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>college education x Roma</td>
<td>-0.059</td>
<td>0.770</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>post-graduate education x Roma</td>
<td>-0.398</td>
<td>1.091</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>const.</td>
<td>-1.194 *</td>
<td>0.678</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Number of observations 279

* p < .1; ** p < .05; *** p < .01; standard errors in parentheses.


Hancock, Ian F. *We are the Romani People*. Hertfordshire: University of Hertfordshire Press, 2002.


