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Breaking the Exclusion Cycle:
Contact, Discrimination, and Cooperation

Chapter 5: Contact†

Our Roma are not civilized.
Anonymous, Novo mesto 2015

And children mocked us, and they were afraid,
and they held themselves apart from us on ac-
count of us being "gypsies," up to 4th or 5th
grade. Then, less. In high school, later, we
were friends.
Anonymous, Murska Sobota 2016

Non-Roma commonly claim that discrimination would stop if the Roma behaved like the majority. The statement above, that "[o]ur Roma are not civilized," is a crude representation of this sentiment. It speaks not only to the fact that the Roma are not seen as equal to non-Roma, but also to the degree of the perceived difference between the two groups. This statement suggests that the Roma have quite far to go before they are seen as equal contributing members of society. The unspoken, but implied understanding, however, is that once they get there, the Roma will be treated as any other such member. The findings from Chapter 4 suggest that this would not be the case. Non-Roma discriminated against the Roma when they interacted with them just once. They discriminated against them when they interacted with them repeatedly. And, importantly, they continued that discrimination even when the Roma behaved no differently than non-Roma. What, then, would it take for non-Roma to stop discriminating? In this chapter, I argue that NGO-promoted intergroup contact might help.

To test the effectiveness of intergroup contact, this chapter introduces a second town, also from Slovenia: Murska Sobota. In many aspects, particu-

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larly those relevant to the treatment of Roma, Murska Sobota quite closely matches Novo mesto. It differs in one crucial way, however. Roma NGO action in Novo mesto centers on the Romani community and engages in service provision, providing educational aid as well as water to the remote parts of the settlement that need it. In Murska Sobota, Roma NGO action focuses on Roma/non-Roma relations and dialogue. Both organizations are very well known among the Roma in their respective towns, but the NGO in Murska Sobota reaches across the ethnic divide. Murska Sobota, about 100 miles away from Novo mesto, is therefore its suitable counterpart for this particular inquiry.

To carry out a comparison of behaviors in the two towns, I conducted the same studies in Murska Sobota. Just as in Novo mesto, I looked first at single interactions, with the trust game, and then at repeated interactions, with the tower game that combines the public goods game and indirect reciprocity. This chapter only presents the findings on non-Roma behavior. Chapter 6 will present and discuss the behaviors of Roma.

While non-Roma from Novo mesto, with service provision, discriminated against the Roma, non-Roma from Murska Sobota, which has intergroup contact promotion, did not. Non-Roma from this town treated the Roma no differently than they treated non-Roma. This was the case in the context of repeated interactions, where early decision-making matters for later success, as well as, remarkably, in the context of single interactions that require no reputation building.

In the study on repeated interactions I was able to isolate particular individuals who discriminated against the Roma to take a closer look at some of the factors they had in common. While they appeared to overwhelmingly believe that the Roma cannot be trusted, and indeed were not swayed by the tower game that purposefully presented them with identical Roma and non-Roma avatars, those who discriminated did not appear do so because of their own bad personal experience with the Roma.

The findings lend support to the expectation that voluntary positive intergroup contact might help reduce discrimination; we can already infer that from the main finding that shows non-Roma from Novo mesto discriminating and non-Roma from Murska Sobota not (Bracic 2016). Further, non-Roma in Novo mesto have very few Roma friends overall; those who have none discriminate more. Of the non-Roma in Murska Sobota, those that have attended events organized by the intergroup contact NGO did not discriminate, and neither did those who were familiar with the organization.

While the findings suggest that promotion of voluntary positive inter-

group contact helps reduce discrimination, open ended answers that participants from both towns provided in one of the exit surveys show that stereotyping persists. While non-Roma from Murska Sobota did not appear to be swayed by the stereotype that the Roma are cheaters and thieves in the games, many still endorsed it.

This chapter proceeds as follows. I first briefly return to the discussion on intergroup contact and summarize the main reasons for which it might be beneficial in encouraging equal treatment. I then present the second location, Murska Sobota, first by discussing how it matches Novo mesto in relevant covariates and then by discussing how it differs. The section presenting NGO action in both locations also addresses problems of endogeneity and omitted variable bias. The section that follows presents and discusses results, first from the single interaction trust game and second from the repeated interaction tower game. I conclude with open questions and possibilities for future research.

How might intergroup contact help interrupt the exclusion cycle?

As a reminder, the exclusion cycle consists of four parts: (1) anti-minority culture, (2) discriminatory behavior by the majority, (3) survival strategies by the minority, and (4) the ultimate attribution error, committed by the majority. Intergroup contact, if effective, would likely affect discriminatory behavior by the majority first, and anti-minority culture second, for two reasons. First, members of the majority are far more likely to respond to positive intergroup contact than are members of the minority (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011, Sidanius et al. 2008, Mutz 2016, Enos 2014, Scacco and Warren 2017). Second, as adjusting one's behavior tends to be easier than changing one's mind, effects of positive contact might manifest through behavioral changes first; changes in levels of prejudice might then follow (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011, Scacco and Warren 2017). Survival strategies, part three of the exclusion cycle, are employed by members of the marginalized minority; since minority populations are less likely to respond to contact, we might only detect a decrease in the use of survival strategies later, once the majority has reduced its discrimination. Finally, the rates of committing the ultimate attribution error might decrease along with decreasing prejudice, but are also likely to present a tougher challenge as a person might have to be aware of committing the error before they are able to stop (Stewart et al. 2010). Intergroup contact alone likely does not

increase that knowledge, at least not in the short term.

Interrupting prejudice and discriminatory behavior by the majority could happen through several mechanisms. The first is a decrease in anxiety. People who have not interacted much with outgroup members tend to experience more anxiety in initial interactions (Blascovich et al. 2001). Positive intergroup contact can decrease this anxiety and so lead to lower levels of prejudice (Page-Gould et al. 2008). Overcoming anxiety also enables empathy, which is the second mechanism through which contact might reduce prejudice and discriminatory behavior (Galinsky and Moskowitz 2000). Outgroup members can develop empathy as they learn to understand some of the concerns that marginalized individuals might have. Cultural learning is a further mechanism that might help interrupt prejudice and discriminatory behavior (Triandis 1994). Finally, intergroup contact might interrupt prejudice and discriminatory behavior through a change in the norms about cross-group interactions (Olson and Stone 2005, Tropp et al. 2014). If positive intergroup contact becomes the norm, individuals will be more likely to engage in it, even if they hold prejudiced beliefs.

Not everyone in a community needs to experince contact for it to be effective. The benefits generalize beyond the individuals involved in the immediate contact situation (Cook 1984, Van Oudenhoven et al. 1996, Sidanius et al. 2008). Thus, ethnic Slovenes who have positive contact with a few Roma are likely to be less prejudiced towards the Roma in general. Further, effects of positive contact can extend beyond the individual who experiences it first-hand; her ingroup friends might exhibit lower levels of prejudice (Wright et al. 1997) as might her neighbors or people who live close by (Christ et al. 2014). Of course, the effects of positive intergroup contact tend to be strongest for people who actually experience it.

Murska Sobota

To test whether sustained promotion of friendly intergroup contact and dialogue helps reduce discrimination and so contributes to breaking the exclusion cycle, I carried out the two studies in a second town, Murska Sobota, also in Slovenia. Murska Sobota matches Novo mesto on a number of relevant factors, named below, but differs in one crucial characteristic. Roma NGO action in Murska Sobota crosses the ethnic divide and actively promotes intergroup contact and dialogue; that in Novo mesto, in contrast, primarily engages in service provision to the Romani settlements and so tends to focus on just the Roma. The section that follows first describes

how the two towns match and then discusses how they differ.

How Murska Sobota and Novo mesto match

Murska Sobota and Novo mesto share a number of demographic and historical characteristics. As they are both from Slovenia, the towns of course also match on all relevant present day state-level characteristics, as well as those that might have been historically relevant.

I selected the towns on the basis of nearest neighbor matching (Ho et al. 2007a, 2007b; Nielsen 2014)[3] on all towns in Slovenia that have a Roma population of at least 50. I excluded locations with fewer than 50 Roma because I needed 50 Roma participants from each location to participate in the trust game. As I determined the set of possible towns using the most recent Slovene Census (2002), this requirement restricted the number of possible locations to 14 towns.[4]

The matching procedure used five covariates. I included *town population*, *Roma inhabitants as proportion of total town population*, and *ethnic majority as proportion of total town population* to achieve balance in town sizes and their ethnic compositions. *Proximity to Slovene/Croatian border* controls for variation in potential exposure to other outgroups. This matters because people from borderlands more commonly interact with outgroups (Mirwaldt 2010), which can result in higher levels of ingroup favoritism. Ingroup favoritism can then result in disparate treatment of all outgroups, regardless of group-specific attitudes (Brewer 2007). Controlling for border proximity accounts for this type of potential variation in strength and saliency of ingroup sentiment. To control for institutional capabilities and resources at the municipal level, both general and those pertaining to the Roma, I included a *regional capital* dummy among the covariates. Regional capitals tend to have more municipal resources. For example, among the twenty-

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[3]The towns in my sample varied too much to merit exact matching; I therefore used the "greedy" matching method of nearest neighbor matching in MatchIt (Ho et al. 2011). This method finds the closest control match for each treated unit one at a time. As I was not looking to find a large number of matched pairs, this method was more appropriate than methods that seek to minimize average absolute distance across all pairs.

[4]There are quite likely over 14 locations with more than 50 Roma in Slovenia; as I mentioned earlier in Chapter 4, census estimates of Roma populations tend to be low. Since the 2002 Slovene Census was the only source that provided systematic data on all locations, however, I nonetheless opted to use it, erring on the side of caution.

four Slovene municipalities that have Romani inhabitants, as reported (and likely underreported) by the Census, only four have a municipal strategy for addressing the needs of their respective Roma communities (Vlada RS 2014). Yet, both regional capitals in the sample have such a strategy. Given a likely mismatch in resources, comparing a town that is a regional capital to a town that is not would be imprudent. The regional capital dummy is therefore the fifth and final matching covariate.

In the matching procedure, Murska Sobota was selected first.[5] It is the only town in Slovenia with a Roma NGO that focuses on intergroup relations. Of the 13 other eligible towns, all without such organizing, Novo mesto was selected as the best match for Murska Sobota.

Murska Sobota and Novo mesto match quite closely on the five factors just named. The two towns also match on factors beyond those included in the matching procedure. The towns are from the two regions that boast the highest percent of Roma in Slovenia. Murska Sobota is the regional capital of Prekmurje, in the northeast, which has the highest proportion of Roma in the country; Novo mesto is the regional capital of Dolenjska, in the southeast, which ranks second. Both towns have the highest proportion of Romani inhabitants in their respective regions: in Murska Sobota, Roma make up 2.27 percent of the population; in Novo mesto, they make up between 1.2 and 2.8 percent.[6] The towns are of comparable sizes, having between 20,000 and 30,000 inhabitants (Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (SURS) 2002). Both are about 10 miles away from the Slovene-Croat border (see Figure 1 for a map).

[Figure 1 about here]

Roma have lived in the two towns for at least 200 years (Horvat-Muc 2011b). This is not always the case in the former Yugoslav space; some Romani communities are in fact fairly new since they arrived as a result of displacement during the Yugoslav wars in the 1990s. Interestingly, in many

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[5]I selected Murska Sobota first because I had already done research there in the context of an earlier project on discrimination against the Roma. In that study, I compared Murska Sobota to Čakovec, a town across the border in Croatia (Bracic 2016).

[6]The lower percent is based on the 2002 census; a local source estimates the higher number (interview with author). See Statistični urad Republike Slovenije (SURS) 2002.

locations the newly arrived refugee Roma have been able to integrate to a much greater degree (Klopčič 2012). It is therefore helpful that both towns chosen for the purpose of comparing Roma/non-Roma relations have Roma communities that have been around for a similar length of time. In both locations, the resident Roma are considered "indigenous." Even so, they are not mentioned as such in primary school curricula used in the towns (Karba 2010). In fact, like in the vast majority of school curricula across Europe, the Roma and their history are not mentioned at all.

As in many places throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the vast majority of Roma in the two towns live in segregated areas. Most live in one central Romani settlement, Pušča in Murska Sobota and Brezje-Žabjak in Novo mesto. The settlements are somewhat isolated, on the outskirts of town, and separated from the main town centers by a stretch of fields and some trees (Ajdič 2008). In both towns, Roma are represented in the local governments (Horvat-Muc 2011a; Tudija 2012). Finally, the 2011 average regional monthly incomes were $1,927 for Murska Sobota and $2,176 for Novo mesto (Statistični urad Republike Slovenije 2011). The similarity is useful since the trust and tower games both involve money.

While the matching procedure did not include a number of relevant population characteristics at the town level, those that I collected from randomly sampled participants can speak to the suitability of the match. First, the two populations should be approximately equivalent in general intolerance. That is, a match is inappropriate if people from Novo mesto are overall more intolerant than people from Murska Sobota. If that is the case, any difference in discrimination may be due to the higher level of intolerance in Novo mesto and not the promotion of intergroup contact in Murska Sobota. Figure 2 (left panel) shows how participants reacted to the possibility of same sex couples adopting children. The plots for the two towns are nearly identical, with two peaks at the extreme ends—participants are either "very bothered" or "not at all." Murska Sobota, then, is not a town without bigots. Next, a Roma-specific check is necessary, to ensure that some anti-Roma prejudice is present in both.

[Figure 2 about here]

To that end, I asked participants how bothered they would be sitting next to a Roma in a doctor's waiting room and whether they would be bothered if children from their family were in kindergarten or school together with

Roma children. The second and third panels of Figure 2 show answers to these two questions. Non-Roma in both towns were most likely to indicate they were "not at all" bothered by the two statements. There are some non-Roma in both towns, however, who would be bothered "a fair amount" by the waiting room scenario, and some who would be "very" bothered by a mixed kindergarten or school. While there is some imbalance between the two towns—there are more people in Murska Sobota who would not be bothered at all—Murska Sobota certainly has non-Roma who harbor anti-Roma sentiment.

Finally, the samples are fairly balanced on gender, age, income, and education, and therefore comparable across locations.[7]

How Murska Sobota and Novo mesto differ

Importantly, Roma NGOs in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto differ in the mode of local Roma NGO action. Like many Roma NGOs throughout Central and Eastern Europe, the NGO in Novo mesto focuses on service provision. As its purpose is to help the resident Romani community, the NGO predominantly engages with the Roma. The organization in Murska Sobota, in contrast, focuses on Roma and non-Roma alike, bridging the ethnic divide and promoting dialogue. Both NGOs developed in the early 1990s.

Service provision NGOs that serve Romani communities are relatively common among organizations that aim to help the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. This is chiefly so because the Roma need help, but also because such organizations tend to be more commonly funded (Anonymous 2013). Romano Veseli in Novo mesto is such an organization. This NGO provides socio-economic aid to the local Roma in need and focuses on education of Romani children and adults (Tudija 2012). Flexible and responsive to the needs of the community, its leader takes up issues that are pressing—from

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[7]The random sample of Roma in the tower game includes 54 and 47 percent women in Novo mesto and Murska Sobota, respectively. The mode for age in both is 18-24 years old, but the median age category is 18-30 in Novo mesto and 31-40 in Murska Sobota. In both locations, the mode for employment status is unemployed. The median category for education is some primary school in Novo mesto and primary school in Murska Sobota. The random sample of non-Roma in the tower game includes 59 and 62 percent women in Novo mesto and Murska Sobota, respectively. In both, the median age category is 41-50, and the employment status mode is fully employed. The median category for education is some college in Novo mesto and high school in Murska Sobota. In both, the monthly income median is 1200-1599 euros.

providing water tanks to a remote part of the settlement to arranging shipping containers for families without a roof over their heads. Its "Eko-etno romska moda" project, started in 2014, uses donated second-hand clothes to create fashionable contemporary clothing and accessories with a traditional Roma twist. With the aim of empowering and preparing them for the job market, the project provides local Roma, particularly women, with the opportunity to design and sew. Romano Veseli does not focus on intergroup relations and non-Roma, aside from an occasional volunteer, are not involved in its activities.[8] Among the Roma, however, the NGO is very well known. Every randomly sampled Romani participant in the trust game was able to identify Milena Tudija, the NGO leader, by name and many profusely praised her efforts.

Stepping in a different direction, Romani Union—Zveza Romov in Murska Sobota promotes intergroup contact and dialogue. In this telling passage, Monika Sandreli, who—together with Jožek Horvat-Muc—leads the effort, explained that to her, the intergroup nature of their organizing was obvious at the outset:

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[8]A non-Roma designer for the Eko-etno project is the sole more permanent non-Roma person involved; she is not from Novo mesto.

> . . . they would ask me, "may we also come to this event?"
> and I thought the question was silly. It was silly because,
> as I told them, I go to your events. I don't know, and I
> said, you see here, everyone is invited, and the event is free,
> I don't see why coming would be a problem at all for you.
> It doesn't say just for the Roma. I really thought it funny.
> Mostly, the majority population thought that we were putting
> these events on just for ourselves [the Roma]. And then we
> started sending out invitations—we did before, but mostly
> to institutions with which we were collaborating, and not
> masses of people. But with "Gypsy night" we really drew
> people in. Because music is without borders and without
> prejudice. So. I can tell you that there was a period of time
> when more non-Roma than Roma came to our events. Roma
> took them as something that just happened to be happening,
> "someone is presenting a book," but non-Roma were more
> interested. And, predominantly, we did not host our events
> in Romani settlements, because then "this is the ghetto, just
> for the Roma." Instead we went to libraries, the cinema,
> the Sobota hall, the castle. You let people know that they
> should come, and then they stop asking if they may. And the
> way it happened, if you convinced someone, they brought
> someone else with them. (Monika Sandreli 2012, interview
> with author)

Here, Monika Sandreli touches on several elements of positive intergroup contact. First, consider anxiety. The initial reluctance of non-Roma to attend NGO events might have been due to anxiety about how to behave or anxiety about how their presence would be perceived by the Roma. The event that finally succeeded in breaching this barrier, the 1992 "Gypsy night" ("Ciganska noč"), is the paragon of a voluntary low stress positive contact situation with high entertainment value (Horvat-Muc 2010).[9] "Gypsy night" is a yearly concert of Romani music and dances that traditionally evolves into a lively party. The party is a true testament to the bridging of cultures between the Roma who are generally more exuberant and Slovenes who

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[9]The name of the event uses a word that is considered a racial slur. The name was chosen by Roma NGO leaders, perhaps as a way of reclaiming the term or perhaps in order to attract a larger and more diverse audience. There are Roma communities in Slovenia that use this word self-referentially.

tend to be more reserved. The relaxed atmosphere promotes familiarity and likely reduces contact-based anxiety even if it does not lead to personal acquaintance or friendship. The event is quite popular; over the years, it has required a change of venues since well over 300 people attend (Sandreli 2012). As anxiety is one of the two strong mediators of intergroup contact—meaning that an increase in intergroup contact might reduce anxiety and thereby lead to lower prejudice and, likely, less discrimination (Blascovich et al. 2001)—it is quite likely that low-stress, fun events like "Gypsy night" contribute to lower levels of animus.

The NGO, however, does not stop there. Its other events—book launches, theater productions, folklore workshops and performances—combine this relaxed atmosphere and its likely effect on contact anxiety with the transfer of cultural knowledge. In 2000, Romani Union started a small, independent publishing house, which publishes local Romani fiction and non-fiction, a newspaper, and proceedings from conferences, as well as recordings of music and Romani fairy tales. Book launches tend to be well attended. The Romani Union amateur theater group often stages plays written by Jožek Horvat-Muc and other Roma that speak to Roma life, while the amateur folklore group stages colorful performances. Starting in 1994, Romani Union has organized a yearly week-long international summer camp where Roma and non-Roma, children, professionals and activists can learn about Romani history, language, culture, and contemporary issues that affect Roma across the globe (Horvat-Muc 2010). While increasing general knowledge is a minor mediator of contact (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011), cultural knowledge in particular is hypothesized to explain a substantial portion of contact's effect on prejudice (Triandis 1994). The activities described—the summer camp, the literature published and available to the general public, and the plays performed—all offer cultural knowledge. In fact, they offer cultural knowledge in different forms such that those who are interested can choose whatever suits them best.[10]

In addition to providing cultural knowledge, these activities likely encourage empathy. While anxiety is "crucially important" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011, 94) and its decrease a likely "central initiator" (Pettigrew and Tropp 2011, 94) of the process that leads from positive intergroup contact to lower prejudice, empathy is just as powerful. The camp, plays, and other publications offer a view of what life is like for the Roma. Romani Union

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[10]To Roma, the NGO provides resources, entertainment, and numerous vehicles of artistic expression as well as a chance to engage in intergroup contact with non-Roma.

therefore does not only aim to reduce contact anxiety, it also encourages non-Roma to relate to their Roma neighbors. Thus, the NGO covers three important mediators of the relationship between contact and prejudice: anxiety, cultural knowledge, and empathy.

The final piece of the intergroup contact effort is Radio Romic, a Roma radio ran by a sister organization. The radio is popular among Roma as well as non-Roma; recently, the number of non-Roma listeners has surpassed that of the Roma. The radio, requiring a lower level of engagement, provides an opportunity for vicarious contact even to those who might not seek it out. Aiming for a broader appeal, the radio plays music that everyone likes, some Roma and some not. Romic also produces a daily hour-long show "Roma world," and a weekly one that airs on numerous other radio stations throughout Slovenia.

An interested non-Roma in Murska Sobota can easily engage with the local Roma, whether she prefers the low key option of tuning in from her car or attending a book launch. Indeed, Romani Union is quite well known among non-Roma in Murska Sobota. Of 100 randomly sampled non-Roma in town, 46 percent were able to name the organization. In contrast, while Romano Veseli is widely known among the Roma in Novo mesto, only 2 percent of randomly sampled non-Roma there were able to name it.[11] This, of course, does not mean that Romano Veseli is an ineffective organization; it is merely indicative of the fact that their efforts center around the local Roma.

Notably, as contact effects generalize broadly, beneficial effects of Romani Union's activities in Murska Sobota are likely not limited to the 46 percent of non-Roma who can name it. Some non-Roma might attend cultural events organized by the NGO without realizing that the NGO organized them. Likely, positive effects of contact on those who attend Romani Union events

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[11]Thirty-three percent of non-Roma indicated that they knew of a Romani NGO; only eighteen percent were able to name any entity and only two percent in fact named a relevant organization. The municipal office for social benefits was the most commonly named "NGO" that dealt with Roma issues. I exclude the mentions of two organizations in reporting the data. The first is a volunteer work organization (Drustvo za razvoj prostovoljnega dela) that does work with the Roma but is neither staffed by Roma nor primarily concerned with Roma issues. Six percent of senders mentioned this organization. The second is Civilna iniciativa, which is an initiative formed by non-Roma that aims to resolve the "Roma question." It was clear that the senders who mentioned Civilna iniciativa understood it to be an organization that does not fight for Roma rights but rather aims to protect non-Roma from the (actual or perceived) negative consequences of living close to the Roma settlement. Two percent of senders named that organization.

or listen to their radio have not only spread to their ingroup friends but also to the people who live in their neighborhoods.

To get a sense of contact between Roma and non-Roma in the two towns, I asked the randomly chosen non-Roma tower game participants how much they thought Roma and non-Roma in their town socialized together, as well as whether they, personally, had any Roma friends and acquaintances. The three plots in Figure 3 present their answers. In Novo mesto, the modal response to the question on how much Roma and non-Roma socialize was "not at all;" in Murska Sobota, the modal response was "some." Regarding Roma acquaintances, just under half of non-Roma from Novo mesto reported having none, while in Murska Sobota the modal response, with 28 percent of participants, was over 10. In both towns participants reported having few Roma friends; in Novo mesto, 85 percent reported having none, whereas in Murska Sobota, the mode was split between 0 and 1-2 friends, with 36 percent of participants in each category. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota therefore appear to have more Roma friends and acquaintances than their counterparts in Novo mesto. Non-Roma from the town with the intergroup contact NGO also believe that Roma and non-Roma socialize more.

[Figure 3 about here]

Two caveats are in order. The first concerns omitted variable bias and the second, endogeneity. Both are possible because neither type of organizing in the two towns was randomly assigned. The difference in the two types of organizing as well as the difference in discrimination today could both be due to a difference in respect for Roma rights prior to NGO development in the early 1990s. In other words, even if we see a difference in discrimination against the Roma in the two towns, this difference might not be due to the fact that one town has organizing that focuses on intergroup contact and the other does not. In fact, it is possible that there is a third factor, say levels of discrimination in the years before organizing started, that may be responsible for not only the type of organizing that developed in each town but also for the levels of discrimination today. This is omitted variable bias. If this is true, we may be mistakenly attributing an observed difference in discrimination to the organizing, while, in fact, both may be due to differences in how the Roma were treated more than 20 years ago.

Evidence suggests that, in fact, Roma in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto received very similar treatment before organizing began in the early 1990s.

Immediately before Slovenia declared its independence on June 25th 1991, relations between Roma and non-Roma in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto were as alike as they have ever been. This is largely due to efforts on inclusion that stemmed from the uniform and strict Yugoslav policies on minorities, which had by then been in effect for several decades, not only across Slovenia but also across other Yugoslav republics (Šiftar 1989). These efforts sought not only formal but also socio-economic inclusion. While respect for minorities in Yugoslavia was paramount, those identities gave way to unity; the people "were a colorful nation . . . but all, including the Roma, Yugoslavians" (Baluh 2012). The insistence on a supraordinate Yugoslavian identity may have reduced animus felt across ethnic and national lines. Indeed, scholarship in social psychology suggests that emphasizing the saliency of a common, supraordinate identity shared by erstwhile outgroup members leads to an improvement in behaviors and attitudes of those members (Gaertner et al. 1993; Gaertner at al. 2000).

This was complemented by employment policies centered on equality, due to which Romani levels of employment in both towns were quite high during the 1980's (Balažek 2012; Klopčič 2012). Both settlements had Romani kindergartens (Tancer 1997; Horvat-Muc 2011b; Balažek 2012) and a similar level of primary school attendance: low, especially in the higher grades (Šiftar 1989; Tancer 1997). The lack of systematic variation in access to resources like employment and education, coupled with the cross-Yugoslav emphasis on a common identity suggests that Roma/non-Roma relations in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto did not differ considerably. As the transition to market economy began, the Roma were among the first to lose jobs (Šiftar 1989; Balažek 2012; Klopčič 2012), partly due to low levels of education which were previously less of an obstacle to employment (Klopčič 2012). In both towns, this happened particularly early (Šiftar 1989); general losses in employment followed, as did an increase in anti-Roma sentiment. It appears, then, that prior to the development of the NGOs, the Roma in both locations enjoyed a relatively high level of socio-economic security and lived in circumstances that encouraged the expression of a Yugoslav identity. Transition, roughly coinciding with early NGO efforts, brought socio-economic insecurity, freedom in identity expression, and anti-Roma sentiment. While several decades of unified policies on minorities and, more importantly, of equality in employment imposed upon all citizens do not guarantee that attitudes towards the Roma in the early 1990's were the same in Murska Sobota and Novo mesto, they do weaken the threat of omitted variable bias.

Endogeneity, another peril that stems from non-random assignment of organizing, suggests that the activists in both towns chose to develop their particular types of NGOs because they thought that those would be effective in their respective towns, while any others would not be. Did Jožek Horvat-Muc and Monika Sandreli focus on intergroup relations and dialogue because they thought that service provision would not work? Does Milena Tudija think that service provision can be effective, but that intergroup contact activities would not help? Interviews with the activists suggest that this is not the case. Instead, the activists chose their respective foci because they are passionate about them. The activists from Murska Sobota, as seen in the quote by Monika Sandreli reproduced above, have been passionate about cross-group activities from the beginning (Horvat- Muc 2011a; Sandreli 2012). Similarly, Milena Tudija engages in service provision because she believes it to be by far the most important cause (Tudija 2012). While my conversations with the activists suggest that leader idiosyncrasies, and not concerns of feasibility, are behind their choices of NGO types, they do not fully resolve endogeneity concerns. They do, however, alleviate them.

While non-random assignment of NGO types exposes the pair of towns to omitted variable bias and endogeneity concerns, this set-up also offers an advantage. Instead of measuring discrimination after selectively exposing participants to artificial contact, as most experimental studies do, I am capturing discriminatory behavior in the wake of contact promotion that developed naturally, on the ground. This is not only a departure from laboratory-based studies that rely on short-term contact situations, but also from field-based studies that manipulate contact situations that last days or even weeks (Green and Wong 2009; Scacco and Warren 2017). In Murska Sobota, Romani Union has been promoting positive intergroup contact for 25 years.

Fully committed to voluntary intergroup contact, the effort by Romani Union is both more subtle and far more sustained than experimental assignments. Non-Roma in Murska Sobota are not exposed to positive contact once or twice or for a period of weeks and then left alone. For them, the option of welcoming positive contact is always there. If they have not yet engaged in it themselves, their neighbors or their friends might have; after all, almost every other non-Roma in Murska Sobota knows the NGO well enough to name it. Having had over two decades to spread, the vicarious effects of positive contact may have even reached the more stubborn local non-Roma. In the next section I examine whether this is indeed the case.

Multiple Interaction and the Tower Game

Unlike in Chapter 4, I will first examine multiple interactions, through the combination of the public goods game and indirect reciprocity. I turn to repeated interactions first because they nudge the participant towards cooperating and so provide a somewhat easier test of discrimination. Recall the hypothetical exchange with the rude Parisian baker and a couple of tourists. Interactions that are repeated happen again and again, and require us to think about the future early on, as our early behavior likely affects how our next interactions will go. In the hypothetical example, the foreign pastry aficionados move in across the street from the Parisian baker, who is no longer brusque when she sells them croissants every morning. Likewise, in the tower building videogame, early behavior matters for later success; participants who cooperate early, stand to benefit more in the end. Single interactions, in contrast, are those that happen just once—in the hypothetical exchange, the Parisian baker can be quite rude to tourists, expecting to never see them again. I will return to single interactions at the end of this chapter; now, I first consider the repeated kind.

To recap, in the tower building videogame, participants have the option of building a tower together with 7 simulated avatars. The tower is a public good; each player receives a brick worth 10 points which they can either keep or contribute to the tower. Once the players have decided whether to contribute their brick, the points in the tower are multiplied by 1.6 and divided, equally, among all players. Those who kept their own brick are best off, having collected points from the tower as well as their brick, but the group is best off if everyone contributes. Each tower-building phase is followed by a reward, or indirect reciprocity, phase. Each participant is randomly shown one of the other players, along with information on how that player behaved in the tower building phase just before. Participants then receive 3 additional points, which they can either keep or use to reward that player; if they choose to reward, that player receives 9 points. Once the reward phase is concluded, the game continues with another tower building phase. Altogether, there are 12 tower building phases in one game, and each is followed by a rewarding phase.

As long as other players are willing to cooperate, the best way to play this game is to cooperate early. If the game were played in a single round, this would not be the case; but as the game repeats and offers a mechanism of rewarding cooperation, early cooperators can benefit more than players who would defect early. Suppose a player decides to free ride early and keeps her

brick in the first round. Seeing a player who seems unwilling to contribute to the public good, other players are likely to conclude that contributing to the tower is not optimal. In a couple of rounds, this is likely to result in continuing defection across the board, especially since contributing is only profitable if others contribute as well.

Each participant played several games which systematically varied both how the other 7 avatars behaved as well as their ethnic identities. In the baseline condition, none of the avatars had ethnic identifiers; this condition was always played first. The remaining conditions were randomized. In the coethnic condition, the identities of avatars matched that of the participant. The mixed condition had equal numbers of Roma and non-Roma players; non-Roma participants therefore played that condition with 4 Roma avatars and 3 non-Roma avatars. The identities of the avatars were presented together before the game started, as well as during the rewards phase. For details on the videogame, see Chapter 4 and, in particular, Figure 3 in that Chapter. There was no deception as I was very clear with the participants that they were playing a videogame where the other 7 players were fictitious, with their behaviors based on the behaviors of real people in their town.

In this game, free riders are a danger to the group. Since interactions are repeated, early freeriding risks a complete breakdown of cooperation; in the end, this would result in a low payoff for everyone and especially for those who contributed to the tower while others did not. In deciding whether to cooperate, participants have very little information about their partners—either nothing, in the baseline, or their ethnic identity. The common stereotype about the Roma, that they are cheaters and thieves, suggests that they might be more likely to free ride than non-Roma. If a participant gives credence to this stereotype, she might be less inclined to contribute her brick to the tower when Roma avatars are in play. Someone who discriminates would so consistently contribute fewer bricks to the tower in the mixed game than in the coethnic game.

In Chapter 4, I presented findings that demonstrate that Roma do not uniformly behave as stereotyped, and that Romani behaviors, just like those of non-Roma, vary from one situation to another.[12] Non-Roma who rely on stereotypes about the Roma might not fully grasp this variation and would instead expect them to defect regularly. Positive intergroup contact like that in Murska Sobota, which aims to reduce anxiety, impart cultural

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[12]Chapter 6 delves deeper and speaks to sources of variation in Romani behaviors.

knowledge, and increase empathy, might result in greater familiarity with the Roma—if not friendship—and a lower need to rely on stereotypes.[13] I therefore expect that non-Roma from Murska Sobota will be less likely to discriminate against the Roma and so to behave consistently across the different games, regardless of the ethnic identities of the avatars presented.

As in Chapter 4, the main three games of interest are those in which the decisions made by all avatars are identical, but which assign those avatars different ethnic identifiers. The first is baseline, assigning nothing; the second is coethnic; and the third mixed. The figures I present here partly reproduce the figures from Chapter 4; I again show the behaviors of non-Roma from Novo mesto, but compare them to those of non-Roma from Murska Sobota. As discussed in Chapter 4, non-Roma from Novo mesto contribute to the tower less often when Roma avatars are included in the group of players. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, in contrast, do not behave any differently when the group of players is mixed. The right panel of Figuree 4 shows how many times, in total, non-Roma from Murska Sobota contributed to the tower in the three games. It is clear that they contributed fewer times, overall, than non-Roma from Novo mesto did (left panel), but they did not change their rate of contributions based on group composition. Non-Roma from Novo mesto quite clearly contributed less when the group was mixed.

[Figure 4 about here]

Figure 5 shows the average contribution to the tower, along with a 95 percent confidence interval, in each round of the three games. Here, too, the different levels of contributions are clear in the case of Novo mesto, again with baseline and coethnic games eliciting equivalent contributions and with the mixed game lagging behind. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, however, contributed roughly the same in all three games. Finally, Figure 6 shows the predicted probabilities of contributing to the tower, again with 95 percent confidence intervals.[14] Non-Roma from Novo mesto contributed their brick with a predicted probability of 0.77 in the coethnic scenario and

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[13]Positive intergroup contact, while having fewer positive effects on the minority, might nonetheless also result in an increase in Roma prosociality. I return to this in Chapter 6.

[14]These are based on a logit model with individual clustered standard errors that

0.78 in the baseline (the two are statistically indistinguishable), but with a significantly lower 0.59 in the mixed scenario. In Murska Sobota, there was hardly a difference. Non-Roma there contributed their bricks with a predicted probability of 0.68 in the baseline, and a predicted probability of 0.66 in both the coethnic and the mixed game (the three are statistically indistinguishable).

The evidence presented in Figures 4, 5, and 6 is quite clear. In the context of the public goods game, non-Roma from Novo mesto discriminated against the Roma, while their counterparts from Murska Sobota did not.

[Figures 5 and 6 about here]

The tower game set up allows me to capture discrimination in another, somewhat different context. This second measure comes from the indirect reciprocity phase, or the reward phase. The reward phase shows the participant one of the other avatars and the way this avatar behaved in the previous tower-building phase. Except for the baseline, which shows only that, the reward phase also shows whether this player was Roma or non-Roma. Participants then receive 3 points and have the opportunity to reward this player; they can either send those points to the player, who receives 9, or they can keep them. Looking at how participants reward the avatars offers additional insight, as participants are reacting to individual players. Do Roma cooperators get rewarded as often as non-Roma cooperators do? Are Roma defectors denied a reward more often than non-Roma defectors? Figure 7 presents the answers to these questions.

[Figure 7 about here]

In rewarding, non-Roma from Novo mesto discriminated, while non-Roma from Murska Sobota did not (see Figure 7). In all cases, rewards for baseline players (no ethnic identifier) were statistically indistinguishable from rewards for non-Roma players. Non-Roma from Novo mesto penalized Roma across the board. They rewarded them less for cooperating than they

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included covariates for gender, age, employment, and education. The model also controlled for the order in which each participant played the randomized games.

rewarded non-Roma (predicted probability of 0.64 vs 0.78), and denied them a reward more often than doing the same for non-Roma when they defected (predicted probability of rewarding 0.28 vs 0.41).[15] Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, in contrast, treated Roma and non-Roma the same, whether they cooperated (predicted probability of 0.64 vs 0.63) or defected (predicted probability of 0.48 vs 0.44). [16] While non-Roma from Murska Sobota rewarded impartially, those from Novo mesto rewarded Roma defectors *and* cooperators significantly less, compared to the baseline.

This is meaningful because rewarding is retrospective. When deciding whether to contribute to the tower, a participant may decide on a strategy based on group composition and based on what she and other players have done in the previous rounds. Ultimately, however, she does not know what the other players will do. She is making a guess. There are no guesses in rewarding; the reward phase shows how an avatar behaved in the previous round. When participants reward Roma cooperators less than they reward their non-Roma counterparts, they are not hedging their bets; they are choosing not to reward Roma who have already cooperated. This is what non-Roma from Novo mesto did. They also withheld rewards more often from Roma defectors. Inasmuch as we see withholding rewards as a form of punishment, this suggests that in Novo mesto, Roma are seen as more deserving of punishment than non-Roma if they are not prosocial.

This speaks to two crucial points. First, it underscores the presence of animus in Novo mesto. In Chapter 4, I raised this point in reference to the lack of adjustment in tower contributions by non-Roma from Novo mesto. If they were truly only treating Roma differently because they expected Roma to cooperate significantly less, they might have adjusted their behavior upon interacting with Roma who cooperated equally as often as non-Roma. They did not. They consistently contributed less in the mixed game than they

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[15]These differences are all statistically significant in the basic regression ($p < 0.05$), but the difference between rewards to Roma defectors and non-Roma defectors loses significance when population controls are added. The difference between rewards to Roma and non-Roma cooperators remains statistically significant ($p < 0.05$).

[16]Rewarding defectors may seem a curious, and certainly an irrational, habit. For Slovene participants, however, such behavior was commonplace. While playing the game, numerous participants made comments suggesting that this was an act of grace, but also of judgment. Independently and on different occasions, two participants said "I will send this to him nonetheless, perhaps he's going to learn something." Ethnic Slovenes are sometimes stereotyped as holier-than-thou and this behavior certainly fits the bill.

contributed in the identical, but coethnic game (see left panels in Figures 4, 5, and 6). That this behavior extends to rewarding, which carries no risk, is sobering. It demonstrates the depth of animus felt, dispelling any possibiity that disparate treatment is due merely to legitimate expectations of Roma defection.

Second, the evidence of disparate treatment in rewarding lends credence to the reputation problem Roma face. In Chapter 3, I discussed the choices that marginalized Roma likely encounter in everyday life. Prosociality is often costly. As negative reputation is pervasive, a Roma might not get the recognition if she acts prosocially; seen as a member of her group and not as an individual, she might instead experience discrimination. Combining the cost of prosociality with the high likelihood of experiencing discrimination regardless of what she does, she might not choose prosociality. If her contribution to the public good is not acknowledged while someone else's is, why should she contribute?

I have now demonstrated that non-Roma from Novo mesto discriminate in two different contexts, while non-Roma from Murska Sobota discriminate in neither. This suggests that intergroup contact and dialogue, promoted for over 20 years in Murska Sobota, can help reduce disparate treatment of Roma. As this study did not randomly assign some participants to contact experiences while leaving others without, it is impossible to claim with certainty that contact caused the lack of disparate treatment to manifest in the case of Murska Sobota. Asking a few more questions of the participants, however, gives me an opportunity to dig a little deeper—not with the purpose of establishing causation, but with the aim of gaining additional insight.

Taking a closer look

The first question to ask the participants is whether they are familiar with Roma NGOs in their respective towns, and whether they attend any events that these NGOs put on. Scholarship on intergroup contact and prejudice finds that direct positive intergroup contact, vicarious, and even contextual positive contact all decrease prejudice, at least for the majority. Still, direct positive intergroup contact is likely to result in stronger effects, which might manifest sooner as there is no need for them to transfer from one individual to another. Asking participants a set of questions on local NGOs that address Roma issues resulted in varied answers, presented in Figures 8, 9, and 10.

[Figures 8, 9, and 10 about here]

The simplest question posed, whether they knew any such organizations, resulted in a fairly balanced answer as 64 percent of non-Roma from Novo mesto and 60 percent of non-Roma from Murska Sobota claimed that they did (left panel of Figure 8). Asking participants to name the NGOs clarifies the unusually high number of yeses given in response to the first question. In Novo mesto, where Romano Veseli engages in service provision, only 1.5 percent of participants were able to name it; in Murska Sobota, 38 percent could do the same (left panel of Figure 9). Finally, I asked participants whether they had attended any events organized by the organization they had in mind. In Murska Sobota, non-Roma can and do attend a range of events; the largest, "Gypsy night," draws over 300 people (Sandreli 2012). Among the participants in my sample, 12 percent said they had (left panel of Figure 10). While this number is not large, it is nonetheless substantial. I recruited participants using random sampling; if we were to generalize to the town population based on these answers, we could reasonably say that about 3000 people from Murska Sobota have been directly exposed to voluntary positive intergroup contact through the NGO.

Twenty-seven percent of Novo mesto participants reported attending an NGO event, a response I consider non-credible for several reasons, not least that Romano Veseli does not host intergroup contact events.[17] For reasons

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[17]First, the NGO in Novo mesto chiefly operates in the settlement, where non-Roma do not go. Second, only one participant was actually able to name the NGO. During my interactions with non-Roma that included general and vague discussions of my work, a common question they asked me was whether I had ever been to a settlement. In Novo mesto, several asked this question with apprehension and looked quite shocked by my answer, which was always the same: "Of course I go to the settlements, but only with my consultant." Non-Roma in Novo mesto seldom venture into the settlement, except in the context of work or perhaps if visiting a friend, which is rare. The Roma tend to be quite attentive and generally, upon spotting a stranger, inquire as to his purpose for the visit to the settlement. For a newcomer, this can be unnerving. In my visits to the settlement, we have often been spotted in a manner of seconds, not minutes, but I have always felt very welcome there. As relations are contentious, non-Roma have little interest in visiting; Roma vigilance and reports of occasional violence only act as additional deterrents. If a non-Roma were to visit, it would likely be under the auspices of the NGO, but since only one participant in the Novo mesto sample was able to name it, this seems unlikely. Most participants who named an "NGO" referred to the municipal office, and a couple specifically mentioned the Romani representative who serves in municipal government. The other commonly identified "organization" was an NGO for volunteer work, which

that will become clear in the coming paragraphs, the actual number for Novo mesto turns out not to matter.

Did direct contact make a difference at the level of the individual? In the tower game, all participants played all the games. I therefore have information on how each individual played in the baseline, the coethnic, and the mixed scenario.[18] Since the avatars play identical strategies, I can capture whether individuals changed their strategies when the ethnic composition of the group changed. The right panels of Figures 8, 9, and 10 present this information. On their y-axes, these plots present the differences in the average amounts contributed to the tower in each game. The basic difference is calculated by subtracting the average amount contributed in the coethnic game from the average amount contributed in the mixed game for each participant. These averages of individual differences are then averaged again, based on the participant subgroup presented in the plot—Figure 8, for example, presents the means of average differences separately for non-Roma who said they knew a Roma NGO and for non-Roma who did not.

The values for the average differences in contributions range from -1 to 1. If a participant on average played the same way—that is, contributed the same number of bricks to the tower, on average, in both coethnic and mixed scenarios—the value of this variable is 0. This is intuitive: 0 means no difference. If participants, on average, contributed more in the mixed scenario, then the value of this variable is positive, between 0 and 1. Finally, if participants on average contributed less in the mixed scenario than they did in the coethnic scenario, the value of this variable is negative, between 0 and -1. The means for each subgroup are presented with 95 percent confidence intervals.

The right panel of Figure 8 presents the means of average differences in contributions for non-Roma who indicated they knew a Roma NGO and for those who did not. Non-Roma from Novo mesto contributed significantly less in a mixed scenario than in a coethnic scenario, whether or not they

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is not a Roma NGO and deals in volunteering more generally. A final NGO, identified by two participants, is a non-Roma NGO that aims to mobilize against the local Roma community, on account of alleged Roma crime and poor neighborly relations. As all participants who named an NGO, with the exception of one, named a different entity, they likely also took part in events organized by that different entity. Their answers, with the exception of one, can therefore not be considered valid.

[18]Recall that the mixed scenario is composed of 4 Roma and 4 non-Roma players. For non-Roma participants, the game therefore has 4 Roma avatars and 3 non-Roma avatars.

reported a (dubious) familiarity with a Roma NGO. That non-Roma from Novo mesto misidentified the NGO is therefore interesting, but not problematic. They discriminated either way. In Murska Sobota, however, there was a difference between the two groups. Non-Roma who said they did not know a Roma NGO contributed less in the mixed scenario; again, the mean for this group is below 0. The mean for non-Roma who reported that they knew a Roma NGO, in contrast, is above 0, suggesting that this group of non-Roma actually contributed more in the mixed scenario.

This finding is compelling. The difference between Novo mesto and Murska Sobota is already interesting, as non-Roma from Novo mesto discriminate across the board. Even more interesting, perhaps, is the gap between non-Roma in Murska Sobota. For someone who strives to improve Roma/non-Roma relations, a result of equal treatment is a feat. To find that non-Roma who are familiar with the NGO in fact try harder to cooperate in a mixed setting than in a coethnic setting suggests remarkable success. Plotting the relationship between the average difference in contributions to the tower and the ability to name the NGO, or reported attendance of NGO events, confirms this finding.

Whether they are able to name the NGO correctly or whether they report attending its events, non-Roma from Murska Sobota contribute more to the public goods game when Roma avatars are in play. Figure 9 plots the average difference in contributions between those who correctly named the NGO and those who did not; non-Roma who named the NGO decidedly contributed more in the mixed game, while those who did not contributed equally, though only just barely. Those who reportedly attended NGO events also contributed more in the mixed games; those who did not, contributed equally in mixed and coethnic games (see Figure 10). Non-Roma in Novo mesto, again, discriminated. Figures 9 and 10 show that they consistently contributed less to the tower in mixed scenarios; whether they knew the name of the NGO was irrelevant as was their reported attendance of NGO events.

The behavior of non-Roma in Murska Sobota is remarkable. Those who are distanced from the NGO, did not discriminate. Those with some familiarity with the NGO did discriminate, but by contributing more in the mixed game. This suggests that they might be trying to compensate for past mistreatment, or perhaps that they are signaling strong commitment to cooperation with Roma. Whether they are doing the first or the second, the strategy of positive contact promotion seems to have worked. How far has it reached? If non-Roma in Murska Sobota do not engage in discriminatory

behaviors against the Roma, is their prejudice gone as well?

Looking at Prejudice

In brief, prejudice persists.[19] Examining it more closely leads to two insights. First, animus towards the Roma is very much present, especially in Novo mesto. Second, prejudice in Murska Sobota has diminished, though it has not disappeared. In what follows, I first discuss participants' answers to a bold open-ended question. These answers demonstrate that non-Roma express their prejudice freely—non-Roma from Novo mesto to a greater extent—and incidentally also speak to the fourth part of the exclusion cycle, the ultimate attribution error. I then discuss the relationship between prejudice and discriminatory behavior, which offers insight into how intergroup contact might be taking effect in Murska Sobota.

What bothers you most about the Roma?

Participants' answers to this bold[20] and somewhat leading[21] question are quite revealing. They demonstrate that on condition of anonymity, non-Roma from Slovenia are quite willing to express prejudice. For example, a participant from Novo mesto wrote that it bothered him/her that the Roma

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[19]This study was primarily designed to capture discriminatory behavior; nonetheless, some of the questions I asked on the exit survey allow me to speak to prejudice.

[20]While asking such a blunt question may be inappropriate in some contexts, Slovenes tend to not to be bothered by directness. None of the participants complained about the question and most were quite comfortable providing blunt answers. Participants were free to skip any question they did not wish to answer; only 35 participants (about 26 percent of the sample) opted to skip this one.

[21]While this question may be leading, it also sounds quite absurd to a person who is not prejudiced. In fact, the obvious answer such a person might give is "nothing bothers me about the Roma;" for good measure, they might also complain about the question. While I did not receive any complaints about the question, a high number of participants (25) answered "nothing," and 4 more gave specific answers as to why nothing bothered them. Overall, "nothing" was one of the two most common answers given; the other one was that Roma "refuse to work."

> [b]eg from house to house despite social benefits and govern-
> ment child support, that they steal, that they engage in ille-
> gitimate business (drugs, weapons). That they don't work,
> they are not clean, that they don't educate themselves. And
> the state gives them a lot without them having to do much
> in return.

Another, also from Novo mesto, was bothered by

> [b]egging, dumpster diving and leaving trash lying all around,
> laziness/unwillingness to work, because he expects the state
> to support them financially, pay their bills and take care of
> their dwellings, irresponsible use of the financial aid obtained,
> violence, engagement in crime, improper maintenance and
> filth (both bodily and of their houses and the surroundings).

A third, from Murska Sobota, wrote

> they know about rights, of which they take advantage, but
> are not aware of responsibilities.

A fourth, also from Murska Sobota, was bothered by Roma women:

> [t]hat they knock on doors begging, while their clothes and
> make-up are impeccable (nice), with small children.

Categorizing the answers into 21 categories reveals substantial overlap
between the two towns on some issues, and substantial divergence on oth-
ers (see Figure 11 for an illustration).[22] Non-Roma from Novo mesto and
Murska Sobota both wrote that the Roma refuse to work, that they lie and
beg; that they are cunning and violent; that they have no interest in educa-
tion, and that they behave inappropriately in public. Consider the following

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[22]The negative categories were: steal, lie, refuse to work, cunning, abuse their rights for
gain, loud, receive excessive social assistance, no interest in education, no interest in being
included in society, violence, unclean, crime, begging, inappropriate behavior in public,
dumpster diving, property intrusion, no respect for public goods and values, and distrust
towards non-Roma. The neutral categories were: nothing bothers me, Roma are the same
as non-Roma, and I have no experience with Roma.

matching statements. A participant from Murska Sobota wrote "they don't like to work and they lie," while a participant from Novo mesto was bothered by "crime, thefts, dishonesty, refusal to work." In Murska Sobota, someone simply wrote "cunning," while someone in Novo mesto explained further: "they are cunning, you can't trust everything they say." A participant in Murska Sobota was bothered by the Roma "ringing the bell, [at] home, intruding into private space without an invitation," while one from Novo mesto felt similarly about Roma "encroaching onto the property of others." While there is remarkable overlap on a subset of mentioned issues, non-Roma from the two towns did not agree on everything.

[Figure 11 about here]

The statements from the two towns diverge in two ways. First, participants from Murska Sobota were less critical. They were more likely to skip this question; of the 35 who did not answer the question, 26 were from Murska Sobota (there are a total of 136 non-Roma participants). Participants from Murska Sobota were also more likely to write that "nothing" bothers them (15, compared to 10 from Novo mesto), or that "Roma are no different from non-Roma" (3, compared to one from Novo mesto). One participant from Murska Sobota perceptively wrote

> I don't know them enough to have something specific to be bothered by. A lot of Roma are disadvantaged because of a hundred years of discrimination. If the attitudes of non-Roma towards the Roma changed, it would be easier for everyone.

In contrast, none of the participants from Novo mesto acknowledged any sort of discrimination against the Roma, although one did lament "they trust me less than they could." Overall, participants from Novo mesto were far more disapproving of the Roma; counting the total number of times each of the 18 negative categories was mentioned, participants from Novo mesto together mentioned something negative 108 times, while participants from Murska Sobota mentioned something negative 45 times.

Second, participants from Novo mesto were much more likely to write that the Roma are thieves and that they are unclean, that they exploit their rights and receive excessive social assistance from the state, and that they have no interest in being included in society (refuse to assimilate).

While 10 participants from Novo mesto wrote that Roma were criminals, no participant from Murska Sobota mentioned crime. That non-Roma from Novo mesto had more than twice as many negative things to say about the Roma provides additional evidence that mistreatment of Roma there is at least partly due to animus.

The responses to "What bothers you most about the Roma?" speak to the exclusion cycle in two ways. Non-Roma answers to this question quite clearly demonstrate the presence of anti-Roma culture and discourse in both towns, though more so in Novo mesto, and thus provide evidence for the first part of the cycle, anti-minority culture.

By asking participants "What bothers you most *about the Roma*?" (emphasis not in survey) the question targets the practice of assigning survival behaviors to the very nature of Roma. This is the ultimate attribution error, part four of the exclusion cycle. Answers to this question did not need to be attribution errors. Participants could have written "nothing," and many did. Others, however, committed attribution errors.

In Chapter 3 I discussed metal scrap collection as a survival strategy that some Roma may resort to in light of high barriers to employment. Sometimes, metal scrap collection involves taking scrap, or what looks like scrap, without asking the owner for permission. A typical attribution error referring to the practice of metal scrap collection, then, might describe Roma as thieves. The answers I received to "What bothers you most about the Roma?" indeed show that the belief that they are thieves is common. In Novo mesto, 13 participants, or 20 percent, thought so; but in Murska Sobota, only one did. Fascinatingly, however, the belief that Roma are thieves is not the primary way in which the attribution error related to discrimination in employment is expressed. Instead, non-Roma believe that the Roma refuse to work. This was the most commonly identified "bothersome" Roma characteristic in both towns. In Novo mesto, 15 participants wrote it down, while in Murska Sobota, 10 did. Participants were remarkably precise in their language. The consistent use of a single, unusual word ("nedelo") lays the responsibility for not having a job entirely at the feet of Roma. This word carries a negative connotation and roughly translates as refusing work. It is not commonly used to refer to unemployment, and so tends not to be a part of one's daily vocabulary in Slovenia. Precisely because it is not commonly used otherwise, its recurrence in my surveys suggests that the idea that Roma refuse to work is quite salient in the two towns.[23]

[23]If they did not wish to assign judgment, participants might have said "nezaposlenost,"

Low levels of education among the Roma were similarly attributed to the Roma themselves, with no recognition given to discrimination in education. Two participants independently wrote that "they [Roma] do not educate themselves;" another was bothered by the fact that "they live from social assistance, without any interest in getting educated." Overall, 3 participants from Novo mesto and 4 from Murska Sobota were bothered by Roma "disinterest in" education.

Roma reliance on social assistance, a clear consequence of barriers to education and employment, was another characteristic commonly attributed to the Roma themselves and not their circumstances. In Novo mesto, 12 participants were bothered by their excessive reliance on social assistance; in Murska Sobota, 4 agreed. Combining several errors, one participant from Novo mesto was bothered by the fact "that they steal, that they lie, that they receive social assistance instead of putting in some effort and working honestly." Another wrote that "they do nothing themselves, they expect to be entirely supported by the state, state institutions." A third participant was bothered by "[t]heir refusal to work and abuse of social assistance by the state." There is a degree of rancor that accompanies some of the statements on excessive reliance on state assistance; the participant I just quoted called it "abuse," as did several others. Another wrote that "the rules that hold for other citizens don't hold for them and they abuse that;" while a third was bothered because they "extort rights."[24] The strength of negative sentiment here suggests resentment.

Answers to open-ended questions offer a glimpse into the thoughts of participants. Inviting complexity, such questions produce answers that do not easily lend themselves to a quick snapshot. While they present a colorful range of attribution errors, they do not tell us how many participants are apt to agree with any particular one. To complement the varied answers just discussed, I asked participants to answer a question that aimed to pin down their level of agreement with an attribution error that is commonly committed in reference to barriers to employment. I asked them—after they answered a more general question—to what extent they agreed with the following statement: "Most Roma earn a living by engaging in criminal

which is commonly used and means unemployment.

[24]This participant likely referred to the idea that the Roma get too many special favors; another participant wrote that the Roma "leverage their rights too well," likely speaking about excessive reliance on social assistance and alleged crimes that go unpunished.

activity, even though they have other options." This statement identifies a rather extreme survival strategy that is not prosocial, engaging in criminal activity, but specifies that engaging in this activity is purely a matter of choice. It attributes engagement in crime to the Roma and their preferences, and not their circumstances.

In Novo mesto, the modal response to this question was "strongly agree." Overall, 62 percent of participants there either agreed or strongly agreed with the statement. In Murska Sobota, most participants who answered this question chose "neutral", and only 16 percent of them agreed or strongly agreed with it.[25] This suggests that non-Roma from both towns are apt to commit this particular attribution error, but that those from Novo mesto appear to do it far more often.

My examination of prejudice so far demonstrates that prejudice persists in both towns, but that there appears to be much less of it Murska Sobota, the intergroup-contact town. The attribution error is likewise committed in both towns, but to a much greater degree in Novo mesto. In the following section I examine discriminatory behavior together with prejudice to explore the puzzling nature of people in Murska Sobota who are prejudiced, but don't discriminate.

As if it weren't there

The claim that "the Roma cannot be trusted" is among the most common expressions about the Roma that I have encountered. It is derived from the stereotype that Roma are cheaters and thieves. I used this phrase to probe participants about prejudice, asking them to indicate to what extent they agreed with it. The left panel of Figure 12 shows the answers. In Murska Sobota, 28 percent of participants either agreed or strongly agreed with this statement. The modal response was neutral, while 25 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. It is jarring to see 1 out of 4 participants in Murska Sobota agree with this claim, especially as it leaves no room for doubt—the claim does not state that *some* Roma *may* not be trusted, but instead quite clearly that none of them can. The answers from Novo mesto are even more unsettling. There, 62 percent, or almost 2 out of 3 participants

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[25]While 63 participants from Novo mesto answered this question, only 48 participants from Murska Sobota did the same. This question followed a more general question of whether participants thought the Roma in their town had a bad reputation. Those who answered affirmatively (almost all in the case of Novo mesto and almost three-quarters in the case of Murska Sobota) were then invited to answer this question.

either agreed or strongly agreed with this sweeping claim. 26 percent were neutral and the remaining 12 percent either disagreed or strongly disagreed. Answers to this question confirm what the free-form answers presented in the previous section suggested: non-Roma from both towns are prejudiced against the Roma, but those in Novo mesto are much more so.

[Figure 12 about here]

How does prejudice translate into action? In Novo mesto, very well, but in Murska Sobota, not at all. The right panel of Figure 12 reveals that in Murska Sobota, there is no relationship between a non-Roma's belief that the Roma cannot be trusted and her average contributions to the tower.[26] Even those who strongly agreed with this prejudiced statement did not discriminate. In fact, all but one group contributed to the tower equally; the group that did not (strongly disagree), contributed more in the mixed scenario. The disconnect between prejudice and discriminatory behavior in Murska Sobota is even more conspicuous when we consider the clear relationship between the two in Novo mesto. There, participants who agreed and strongly agreed with the prejudiced statement contributed significantly less to the tower in the mixed game. As in Murska Sobota, those who disagreed or were neutral contributed the same amount, and those who strongly disagreed contributed more in the mixed scenario. In Novo mesto, then, participants who were prejudiced discriminated, while those who were not prejudiced did not. The two contrasting findings speak to how intergroup contact might be taking effect: not by eliminating prejudice and stereotypes, but by stopping people from acting on them.

Prejudice does not necessarily lead to discriminatory behavior. Consider overt racism and vote choice in the US. Tali Mendelberg (2001) writes that voters in the US tend to be much more susceptible to implicit racism than its explicit alternative. This is not necessarily because they are any less prejudiced. As racism has become socially unacceptable, people who are prejudiced wish neither to be seen as racist nor to see themselves as racist. To avoid that, they might conceal their prejudiced preferences by, say, not voting for an explicitly racist candidate. If, however, a candidate were to

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[26]The correlation between the two is very low (-0.07) and not statistically significant (p=.60). In Novo mesto, the correlation between the two is moderate (-.50) and statistically significant (p<0.001)

make implicit racial claims—speaking about welfare or crime in the inner cities—that can be interpreted as orthogonal to race, voters who are prejudiced might vote for him, especially if they believe that their preferences on crime and welfare have nothing to do with race.

Following a similar logic, non-Roma from Murska Sobota may curb their disparate treatment of Roma because discrimination seems less socially acceptable there. With increasing rates of voluntary positive intergroup contact ensured by the NGO, such contact was more commonly observed and norms about group interactions, or people's perceptions of such norms, might have changed. As the norm of positive intergroup contact became more salient, discrimination might have become a less socially desirable alternative. A person can follow new norms of intergroup interaction even if she is prejudiced, and over time, her prejudice may even abate (Olson and Stone 2005). In fact, extensive research in social psychology shows that attitude change often follows behavioral change, and not the other way around (Olson and Stone 2005). The link to intergroup contact is quite clear; as Tropp and Pettigrew (2011) write, "optimally structured intergroup contact offers a means of behavior modification, with new behavior leading to changed attitudes" (90).

Having observed and captured prejudice and discriminatory behaviors in the two towns, I can conclude the following. In Murska Sobota, voluntary positive intergroup contact likely helps reduce discrimination by making positive cross-group interactions more normatively salient. This encourages the non-Roma there to avoid acting on their prejudice. As they instead engage in positive cross-group interactions, their prejudice gradually subsides. While directly engaging in voluntary positive intergroup contact activities put on by the NGO is linked to behaviors that privilege cross-group cooperation, even vicarious or contextual contact has positive effects. Even participants who are not familiar enough with the NGO to name it do not discriminate.

But what if . . . ?

What if I found greater discrimination in Novo mesto because non-Roma there are more intolerant in general and not because the town lacks a contact promoting NGO? This is one of two concerns that pose a serious challenge to the findings; both are addressed in this section, starting with this one. The information I presented in the matching section suggests that non-Roma in the two towns do not appear to differ considerably in their general level of intolerance. To further test for this possibility, I explored how partic-

ipants in both towns felt about a completely different outgroup. If the findings were indeed picking up general anti-outgroup sentiment and not merely anti-Roma sentiment, then participants' attitudes towards a different outgroup should match up with their discriminatory behavior against the Roma. That is, a generally intolerant participant should also discriminate against the Roma. If however, discrimination against the Roma is related to Roma-specific intolerance, there should be no relationship between how participants feel about a different outgroup and how they treat the Roma.

To establish how the participants felt about a different outgroup, I asked them to indicate the extent to which they were bothered by "Slovenia potentially receiving several hundred African migrants."[27] Besides the Roma, African migrants are the most visible outgroup in the otherwise fairly homogenous Slovenia. I chose this particular question because Slovenia is not a destination country and sentiment about someone who is passing through might be different from sentiment about someone who is posed to stay. I chose to use the word "migrants" and not "refugees" because I wanted to avoid underscoring that the people arriving were victims, chiefly because the Roma are generally not seen as such. This should result in a cleaner comparison. Figure 13 presents how participants from both towns reacted to this statement (left panel) and how those reactions stack up against their behavior in the tower game (right panel).

[Figure 13 about here]

The left panel of Figure 13 shows that participants from the two towns felt quite similarly about the migrants who might stay. The modal responses in both towns were "not at all bothered," while the second most likely answers in both were bothered "some." Quite a few participants were "very bothered" or bothered "a fair amount"—18 percent in Novo mesto and 25 percent in Murska Sobota. Interestingly, participants from Murska Sobota, who did not discriminate against the Roma, were slightly more bothered, on average, than participants from Novo mesto. The similar overall response to this question suggests that non-Roma from Novo mesto were not substantially more prejudiced when it came to a different outgroup (for their anti-Roma sentiment, take another look at Figures 11 and 12). Further,

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[27]This number is based on widely publicized EU refugee quotas.

the right panel of Figure 13 shows that in *both* towns participants who were "very bothered" about migrants contributed equivalent average amounts to the tower. In Murska Sobota, participants contributed equivalent average amounts regardless of how they felt about migrants. And, curiously, participants from Novo mesto who were "not at all bothered" about migrants discriminated against the Roma. These findings therefore do not only suggest that participants from Novo mesto are not generally more intolerant than those from Murska Sobota, but also show that in both towns, prejudice against the migrant outgroup is unrelated to discrimination against the Roma.[28]

The second challenging question is as follows. What if I found greater discrimination in Novo mesto because non-Roma there have had worse personal experiences with Roma? This is a tough question. Given that non-Roma in Novo mesto discriminate against the Roma and that mistreatment spurs survival strategies, Roma/non-Roma relations there are almost certainly worse. Worse personal experiences related to intergroup interaction might therefore be unavoidable, and in light of those, discrimination motivated by bad personal experiences seems almost certain. Yet, while that might be true, we do not know if bad personal experiences are linked to discrimination. To explore this, I asked non-Roma participants whether they had ever had a bad experience with the Roma. Figure 14 shows how many did (left panel), and how that is related to their tower contributions.

[Figure 14 about here]

In Novo mesto, 44 percent of participants report having had a bad experience with the Roma; in Muska Sobota, 24 percent report the same. The difference is not surprising. More unexpected, perhaps, is the finding that having a bad experience does not appear to matter. In Novo mesto, participants who reported having had a bad experience contributed significantly less in the mixed game, but so did those who had no bad experiences. Both discriminated, and to a very similar degree. In Murska Sobota, there was no difference either, as both types of participants contributed essentially

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[28]The correlation between the reactions to migrants and the average difference in contributions to the mixed and coethnic games was 0.02 (p=0.91) in Novo mesto and 0.03 (p=0.84) in Murska Sobota.

equivalent amounts in both games.[29] These findings, then, suggest that discrimination observed in Novo mesto was in fact unrelated to bad personal experiences with the Roma.[30] What sorts of bad experiences did non-Roma report? Most described theft, some vandalism, and some childhood bullying. Some were absurd. One participant wrote "I gave them a dress, but she threw it away around the next corner; they stole mushrooms from my car and ate our dog."

A Tougher Test: The Trust Game

Earlier in this chapter I wrote that the tower game provides an easier test of discrimination than the trust game. This is because the combination of repeated interactions and indirect reciprocity (rewarding) nudges the participant towards cooperation: first, participants who cooperate early and defect late stand to gain more—as long as they can get other players to cooperate as well,—and second, cooperating is likely rewarded. In this context, participants may then be more inclined to cooperate—not because they don't want to discriminate, but because they want to get the most out of the game. Granted, as participants from both towns played the tower game, any difference between the two is likely to manifest despite the game encouraging cooperation. Nonetheless, to subject non-Roma from Murska Sobota to a tougher test—one that does not encourage cooperation—I asked 101 randomly sampled participants in each town to play the single interaction trust game.

Briefly, in the trust game (Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe 1995), 202 non-Roma from Novo mesto and Murska Sobota were assigned the role of senders, and randomly and anonymously paired with either Roma or non-Roma receivers. They knew that their partners were from their town, randomly chosen, anonymous, an either Roma or non-Roma. They also knew that they would never find out who their partner was. As senders, they received an endowment of 6 euros; they knew that their partner received the same. They then had the choice of sending some, all, or none of their 6 euros to

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[29]The 24 percent of participants with a history of bad experiences in Murska Sobota did contribute more to the coethnic group, on average, but the difference was not statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

[30]In Novo mesto, the correlation was -0.08 (p=0.53); in Murska Sobota it was -0.16 (p=0.2).

their partner. Whatever they sent, I doubled. Whatever they did not send, they kept. They knew that the receiver would receive the doubled sum in addition to her initial 6 euro endowment, and that the receiver would then have the option of dividing the total pot in any way she chose between herself and the sender. Just as the sender did, the receiver had the option of keeping the entire pot for herself. The sender would then receive whatever his partner sent back to him, and the game would end.

Crudely, I wanted to see whether non-Roma senders would send less to Roma than to non-Roma receivers. A trust game sender is better off if she sends something to the receiver, but only if she is paired with a receiver who is willing to send enough back. If, however, she does not trust her receiver to return anything, or enough, she should keep her 6-euro endowment and send nothing. When deciding how much of the endowment to send, the senders had very limited information about their partners, but they knew that they were either Roma or non-Roma. The universal stereotype about the Roma is that they are cheaters and thieves. If non-Roma senders expected the Roma to behave as the stereotype suggests, and keep too much or even the entire pot, they might have sent less to Roma than they sent to non-Roma. Such a difference in behavior would suggest discrimination.

This is exactly how non-Roma from Novo mesto behaved; in Chapter 4, I showed that they sent significantly less to Roma than they did to non-Roma receivers. Figure 15 reproduces this result. Figure 15 also shows that non-Roma from Murska Sobota did not behave this way. Again, non-Roma from Murska Sobota did not treat Roma any differently. They sent 57 percent of their endowment to their non-Roma partners and 58 percent to their Roma partners. This difference is negligible; effectively, they sent no more and no less to the Roma. This result stands in sharp contrast to that from Novo mesto, where non-Roma clearly favored their coethnic trust game partners. When paired with coethnics, non-Roma from Novo mesto sent 78 percent of their endowment; when paired with Roma, they sent 58 percent.

[Figure 15 about here]

Regression results, presented in Table 1 in Chapter 4, confirm this finding and provide further insight. The logit regression analysis controlled for education, gender, income bracket, risk preference, and people's willingness to donate money to an anonymous family in need; it also included interaction terms between the control covariates and the treatment variable (ethnic

identity of the receiver, labeled as Roma).[31] The conditional marginal effect for non-Roma from Murska Sobota is not statistically significant. This means that when the identity of the trust game partner changed from Roma to non-Roma, the proportion of the endowment sent to the partner remained the same. For non-Roma from Novo mesto, in contrast, the marginal effect was statistically significant. They, on average, sent 33 percent less of their endowment to Roma receivers than they did to non-Roma receivers.

Although non-Roma from Novo mesto on average sent significantly less to their Roma partners, they actually sent them just as much as non-Roma from Murska Sobota did: 58 percent of their endowment. If they sent them just as much money, then, is that still discrimination? It is. Discriminatory behavior often manifests as a result of ingroup favoritism, and not outgroup hostility, especially now. Greenwald and Pettigrew (2014) in fact understand "ingroup favoritism as not just *a* cause but as the *prime* cause of American discrimination" (670, emphasis in the original). While Greenwald and Pettigrew ground their finding in research on racism in the US, Balliet et al. (2014) take a more expansive look. Performing a meta-analysis on 212 studies of costly cooperation with ingroup members, strangers, and/or outgroup members, they find that intergroup discrimination is indeed driven by ingroup favoritism. This means that discrimination tends not to be derived from hatred of the outgroup, but instead from favoring one's ingroup. The results from the trust game suggest that this is the case here as well. That non-Roma senders from Murska Sobota treated everyone as "poorly" as non-Roma senders from Novo mesto treated the Roma is trivial; what truly matters, is that non-Roma from Novo mesto treated Roma and non-Roma *differently.* Even if the Roma got the same sum regardless of where they lived, they were still discriminated against in Novo mesto, but not in Murska Sobota. And, as detailed earlier in this chapter, neither town is in fact bereft of prejudice; rather the opposite.

A natural concern that arises in light of this difference in behaviors of non-Roma from the two towns is that perhaps, the Roma from the two towns behave differently as receivers in the trust game. If, for example, the Roma from Novo mesto return substantially less as receivers than Roma from

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[31]As each town was treated as a block, each treated observation (sender partnered with a Roma receiver) was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in its block (town) who were assigned to the treatment condition and each control subject was weighted by the inverse of the proportion of subjects in its block who were assigned to the control condition (Gerber and Green 2012).

Murska Sobota do, it would make perfect sense for non-Roma from Novo mesto to send less. This is not the case, however. As presented in Figure 1 in Chapter 6, the Roma from both locations are remarkably consistent in their behavior as receivers in the trust game. On average, the Roma from the two towns return essentially the same proportion of the total pot. The size of the total pot, in turn, is the same as well, since Roma from both towns received on average 58 percent of the endowment from their senders.

Another reason behind the equitable treatment of Roma in Murska Sobota might be that the level of social capital is simply higher there. This, however, does not seem to be the case either. Based on the results from the dictator game mentioned just above, in which the senders were asked to divide 6 euros between themselves and a local family in need, altruism levels are actually higher in Novo mesto. Senders in Novo mesto sent on average 83 percent of their endowment to the family in need, while those from Murska Sobota sent on average 70 percent. The difference between these amounts is statistically significant ($p < 0.05$). The same people who systematically sent less to Roma partners in the trust game, were therefore *more*, not less, generous when it came to the family in need. This finding does not support the idea that social capital is higher in Murska Sobota; if anything, it suggests the opposite.

Thus, non-Roma from Murska Sobota appear to treat Roma no differently than they treat non-Roma—despite the fact that overall levels of social capital do not appear higher there and despite the fact that Roma there behave the same way as receivers as the Roma in Novo mesto. Standing in stark contrast to the finding in Novo mesto, this result, too, suggests that sustained promotion of positive, voluntary intergroup contact and dialogue can help reduce discriminatory behavior.

This finding is notable because it manifested in the context of a one-shot game played confidentially with an anonymous partner. Completely ruling out a need to exhibit high trust on account of future interactions, this game captures a sender's gut-level reaction to the information that her partner is either Roma or not. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota who played this game indicated that they trusted Roma just as much as they trusted non-Roma. Whether or not they believed the stereotype that the Roma are cheaters and thieves, their decisions reflect a profound disregard for it.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examine the effectiveness of NGO-promoted intergroup contact in helping break the exclusion cycle. To do that, I introduce a second Slovene town, Murska Sobota, which matches Novo mesto on a host of relevant covariates, but which differs in the mode of Roma NGO action. In Novo mesto, the Roma NGO provides services, while in Murska Sobota the Roma NGO promotes intergroup contact and dialogue. I repeat both studies in the second town, and find the following.

As established in Chapter 4, non-Roma from Novo mesto consistently discriminate against the Roma. They discriminate in both single and repeated interactions, in real time and when awarding past behaviors, and even when Roma behaviors are identical to non-Roma behaviors. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, in contrast, do not discriminate. They treat Roma no differently than they treat non-Roma—in single and in repeated interactions, in real time and when rewarding past behaviors, as well as when Roma and non-Roma behaviors are identical.

Delving deeper, I explore free and solicited expressions of anti-Roma sentiment. I find high levels of prejudice among non-Roma in Novo mesto; those who express anti-Roma sentiment also engage in discriminatory behaviors. Overall levels of anti-Roma sentiment are lower in Murska Sobota and, more importantly, even non-Roma participants who expressed it appeared not to have acted on it. Further, while non-Roma from both towns still commit the attribution error, non-Roma from Murska Sobota do it to a much lesser degree.

Altogether, then, non-Roma from Murska Sobota appear to not discriminate, to be less prejudiced, and to, even if prejudiced, avoid expressing that prejudice through discriminatory behavior. These findings suggest that contact-promoting NGO action might have indeed helped break the exclusion cycle in Murska Sobota, by helping reduce discrimination (part 2 of the cycle) and, consequently, the expression of anti-Roma sentiment (part 1) and the incidence of the ultimate attribution error (part 4 of the cycle).

Chapter 6 examines the remaining part of the cycle, part 3, and Roma behaviors.

Figure 1: Map of the two towns. Murska Sobota, on the right, has an intergroup contact promotion NGO. Novo mesto, on the left, has a service provision NGO.

Reaction to same sex couples potentially
adopting children

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is very bothered at all and 5 is not at all bothered,
how bothered are you by same sex couples being able to adopt children?

Reaction to sitting next to a Roma in a doctor's waiting room

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is very bothered at all and 5 is not at all bothered,
how bothered are you with sitting next to a Roma in a doctor's waiting room?

Reaction to having children go to school or
kindergarten with Roma children

On a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is very bothered at all and 5 is not at all bothered,
how bothered are you with children from your family going to school or
kindergarten with Roma children?

Figure 2: Capturing participants' Roma-specific and unrelated prejudice.

Opinion on Roma and non–Roma socializing

In your opinion, how much do Roma and non–Roma socialize in your town?
Do they go to the same cafes and chat with each other at shops or in markets?

Number of reported Roma acquaintances

Number of reported Roma friends

Figure 3: How much to Roma and non-Roma interact?

Tower building behavior by non–Roma in Novo mesto

Tower building behavior by non–Roma in Murska Sobota

Figure 4: This figure presents participants' decisions about contributing to the tower in the first three games. The first three games consist of identical scenarios that vary only in their presentation of ethnic identities of the avatars. The first game, "baseline," was always played first and did not present any ethnic identifiers. The second game, "coethnic," is identical to the baseline except that all the avatars are shown as having the same ethnic identity as the participant. The third game, "mixed," also otherwise identical to the baseline, presents a mix of coethnics and others to the participant. There are always 4 Roma players and 4 non-Roma players; if the participant is Roma, 3 out of the 7 avatars are Roma and 4 are non-Roma (and vice versa). As each game presents an iterated combination of public goods and indirect reciprocity, a participant decides 12 times whether to contribute to the tower (the y axis presents the total number of decisions taken by all participants). Non-Roma from Novo mesto, on the left, contributed more in the baseline and coethnic games than they did in the mixed game. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, in contrast, contributed close to the same amount across all three games. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota contributed less than non-Roma from Novo mesto; their contributions in the three games were roughly equivalent to what non-Roma from Novo mesto contributed in the mixed game.

Figure 5: This figure presents the average contribution to the tower, along with the 95 percent confidence intervals, that participants made in each round of the first three games. As described in the previous figure, these games consist of identical scenarios and differ in the assignment of ethnic identities to the avatars. The "baseline" game does not assign ethnic identities, the "coethnic" game assigns identities that match the participant, and the "mixed" assigns a mix of Roma and non-Roma identities. Non-Roma from Novo mesto, on the left, on average contribute to the tower about 80 percent of the time in the baseline and coethnic scenarios. In the mixed scenario, they on average contribute about 70 percent of the time. Non-Roma from Murska Sobota, on the right, on average contribute about 65 percent of the time, regardless of group composition.

Figure 6: This figure presents the predicted probability of contributing to the tower in the first three games, again for non-Roma from Novo mesto on the left and for non-Roma from Murska Sobota on the right. The predicted probabilities with their 95 percent confidence intervals are based on logit models with individual clustered standard errors that included covariates for gender, age, employment, and education. The model also controlled for the order in which each participant played the randomized games. The predicted probability of contributing to the tower for non-Roma from Novo mesto is lower when Roma are included in the tower game. For non-Roma from Murska Sobota, the predicted probabilities remain the same across all games.

Non-Roma predicted probability of rewarding a
Roma cooperator, non-Roma cooperator, Roma defector,
and a non-Roma defector in the tower game (Novo mesto)

Non-Roma predicted probability of rewarding a
Roma cooperator, non-Roma cooperator, Roma defector,
and a non-Roma defector in the tower game (Murska Sobota)

Figure 7: This figure presents the predicted probability of rewarding the player whose avatar is shown in the reward phase. The reward phase shows the avatar, the ethnic identity of that avatar (except in the baseline), and the avatar's tower game decision in the previous round. The left panel presents rewarding behavior of non-Roma from Novo mesto. They reward Roma cooperators significantly less than non-Roma cooperators; they do the same for defectors (p < 0.05). The right panel shows rewarding behavior of non-Roma from Murska Sobota, who are impartial in rewarding and reward all cooperators and all defectors the same. The predicted probabilities with their 95 percent confidence intervals are based on logit models with individual clustered standard errors.

Figure 8: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma familiarity with Roma NGOs in both towns. The answers from Novo mesto are not realistic (see the main text). The right panel shows the difference in the average amounts contributed to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games, by participant. As each participant played identical games, one coethnic and one mixed, I can observe whether their strategies changed when Roma avatars were included in the game. The basic difference is calculated by subtracting the average amount contributed in the coethnic game from the average amount contributed in the mixed game for each participant. If the difference is negative, they contributed less in the mixed game; if it is positive, they contributed more in the mixed game. The plot on the right panel shows the means and 95 percent confidence intervals of these differences for non-Roma who said they knew a Roma NGO and for non-Roma who did not. In Murska Sobota, participants who said they knew a Roma NGO contributed more in the mixed game, while participants who did not contributed less in the mixed game. In Novo mesto, everyone contributed less in the mixed game.

Figure 9: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma ability to correctly name a Roma NGO in town. In Figure 8 just before, a number of non-Roma form Novo mesto claimed to know a Roma NGO, but were unable to name one correctly (most named unrelated entities or NGOs). This Figure is more realistic. The right panel of this figure shows the mean difference in average contributions to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games, by participant. In Novo mesto, non-Roma contributed significantly less in the mixed game (the 95 percent confidence intervals do not include 0). In Murska Sobota, non-Roma who were unable to correctly name a Roma NGO substantively contributed less in the mixed scenario, but the 95 percent confidence interval touches 0. Non-Roma in Murska Sobota who were able to name a Roma NGO, however, contributed significantly more in the mixed scenario. In Murska Sobota, naming a Roma NGO is linked to higher non-Roma prosociality in the mixed game, while not naming one is linked to contributing equally in both games.

Figure 10: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma reported attendance of Roma NGO events in town. Again, the reported attencance in Novo mesto is unrealistic; participants likely mistook events organized by other entities as Roma NGO events. The right panel of this figure shows the mean difference in average contributions to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games, by participant. In Novo mesto, all non-Roma contributed significantly less in the mixed game (the 95 percent confidence intervals do not include 0). In Murska Sobota, non-Roma who did not report attending any Roma NGO events contributed equally, on average, in both games (the 95 percent confidence interval includes 0). Non-Roma in Murska Sobota who reported attending Roma NGO events, however, contributed significantly more in the mixed scenario.

Figure 11: This figure shows non-Roma answers to the question "What bothers you most about the Roma?", by town. The answers are categorized into 21 categories. If a participant mentioned several issues, each issue is counted separately in the appropriate category.

Figure 12: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma agreement with the statement "the Roma cannot be trusted," by town. Non-Roma from Novo mesto tend to agree with this statement; 62 percent either agreed or strongly agreed. In Murska Sobota, 28 percent either agreed or strongly agreed. The right panel plots agreement with the statement, in both towns, along with the mean difference in average participant contributions to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games. In Novo mesto, there is a distinct relationship between the two. Participants who strongly disagree with the statement that "the Roma cannot be trusted" contribute more in the mixed game, while those who agree with this statement contribute significantly less in the mixed game. In Murska Sobota, there is no distinct relationship; even those who agree with the prejudiced statement, contribute equally in both games.

Figure 13: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma reactions to the potential arrival of migrants, by town. The right panel plots these reactions along with the mean difference in average participant contributions to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games. In both towns, there is no distinct relationship between how non-Roma feel about migrants and how they behave in tower building. In both, non-Roma who are "very bothered" by potential migrants contribute equally in the coethnic and the mixed games (the 95 percent confidence intervals include 0). On the other end of the scale, non-Roma who are "not at all bothered" by potential migrants also contribute equally in Murska Sobota; in Novo mesto, they contribute less in the mixed game. In Murska Sobota, non-Roma who are welcoming to migrants and non-Roma who are not at all, behave identically. In Novo mesto, non-Roma who are welcoming to migrants behave worse.

Figure 14: The left panel of this figure shows non-Roma reports of bad personal experience with Roma, by town. In Novo mesto, more non-Roma report having had a bad experience with Roma. The right panel plots reports of bad experience along with the mean difference in average participant contributions to the tower in the mixed and coethnic games. In Novo mesto, there appears to be no difference between the two groups. Non-Roma who reported bad personal experience with the Roma contributed less in the mixed game, but so did non-Roma who reported no bad personal experiences. In Murska Sobota, participants from both groups contributed to the tower equally in both games (the 95 percent confidence intervals both include 0). In both towns, having had a bad personal experience with the Roma did not seem to matter for how a participant behaved during the games.

Average proportion of endowment non–Roma senders sent
to receivers in the trust game, by receiver ethnicity


Figure 15: This plot presents the average proportion of the trust game endowment that non-Roma participants sent to their non-Roma and Roma receivers, respectively. The plot also shows 95 percent confidence intervals. For Novo mesto, the difference between the two means is statistically significant the 5 percent level ($p < 0.05$). For Murska Sobota, the confidence intervals overlap almost completely; the difference between the means is not statistically significant and is negligible. Non-Roma from Novo mesto send significantly less to Roma than non-Roma receivers, while non-Roma from Murska Sobota send essentially the same to both.

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